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Abstract 
 
Rhode Island’s Wars:  
Imperial Conflicts and Provincial Self-Interests in the Ocean Colony, 1739-48 
 
Whether in terms of political and military threats or economic and demographic 
growth, this thesis argues that Rhode Island’s involvement in this period of imperial 
warfare was characterized by self-interest on a variety of levels.  The government’s 
military plans, the expansion of provincial power, attempts to raise expeditionary forces, 
the use of privateers, and the indirect participation of non-combatants all depict a colonial 
society very interested in its own local political and economic interests. Although literally 
“provincial,” these interests exhibit the Atlantic and global networks that the smallest of 
the New England colonies was situated in. These two different sets of concerns, the 
political and economic, sometimes clashed and at other times combined as politicians, 
merchants, sailors, soldiers, and citizens participated in the dual conflicts.  The War of 
Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s War may have been imperial in origin, but personal and 
colonial interests were paramount to regional New England and imperial British 
concerns. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Between 1739 and 1748 the colonists of British North America, especially in New 
England, endured incessant war.  The initial conflict, the War of Jenkins’ Ear, began in 
1739.  Sparked by grievances leveled at Spain before the House of Commons by harassed 
mariners, most notably of which was the eponymous Robert Jenkins, the war set off a 
series of naval engagements, expeditions and invasions that reached from the colony of 
Georgia to the shores of South America.  This conflict widened in 1744 as the British 
Empire became entangled in the War of Austrian Succession. Britain and her allies soon 
faced a host of enemies in addition to Spain, including France, Prussia, Sweden, and 
smaller Italian and German states.   
 As was the case with both earlier and future wars of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, these overlapping conflicts were global in nature, with actions taking 
place in Europe, the western hemisphere, and on the high seas.  Colonial North American 
involvement began with the War of Jenkins’ Ear and intensified greatly in 1744 with the 
start of King George’s War, a conflict that pitted the colonists against the French for the 
next four years.  During this time New England soldiers and sailors conducted several 
expeditions against the colonial possessions of their enemies.  In 1740 they were involved 
in the botched amphibious assault on Cartagena, a strategic trading post in the Spanish 
colony of New Grenada.1  Five years after this stunning failure, New England forces 
again took to the sea and landed at another enemy colonial strongpoint: the French 
fortress at Louisbourg located on the northeastern shore of Cape Breton Island. 
 Among the participants in these endeavors were contingents of men from the 
colony of Rhode Island.  Despite having one of the lowest populations of Britain’s 
                                                 
1
 Cartagena is located on the Caribbean coast of modern day Columbia. 
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mainland colonies2 and being the smallest in size, Rhode Island was actively involved in 
this period of war.  The 1740s were a time of both growth and vulnerability for the 
colony.  On the one hand, Rhode Island colonists were a people on the move.  The 
colony’s merchant and privateer ships cruised the Atlantic and Caribbean, raiding enemy 
commerce and conducting a lucrative trade with the West Indies, Britain and the coastal 
ports of the mainland colonies.  On the islands, peninsulas and mainland of the colony 
during this period, highways were being constructed, bridges being built, and a number of 
new towns formed as the population continued to climb at a steady pace.  Providence and 
Newport, the colony’s dual urban centers, were also expanding, creating a considerably 
urban population, especially when compared to the other British possessions of this 
period.3 
At the same time the colony was also facing a number of threats that endangered 
its borders, safety, and the relative independence of its government.  Because of the wars 
the people of Rhode Island felt that their security was directly threatened by the 
possibility of raids or even invasion.  This fear was felt not only by the governor and 
assembly but also by vulnerable groups such as the merchants of Newport and the 
inhabitants of Block Island.  In addition to these wartime perils, Rhode Island faced 
political threats abroad and close to home.  During the years leading up to the start of 
hostilities in 1739, the charter of the colony, which allowed for self-governance of the 
colony, came into question by the increasingly scrutinous imperial metropole.  At the 
                                                 
2
 In 1740, Rhode Island is estimated to have had a little over 25,000 inhabitants.  It only ranked higher than 
Georgia, New Hampshire, and the semi-autonomous Delaware. Jack P. Greene, ed., Settlements to Society 
1607-1763: A Documentary History of Colonial America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975), 238. 
3
 By 1748 over one-third of the population of Rhode Island lived in either one of these cities. Lynne 
Withey, Urban Growth in Colonial Rhode Island: Newport and Providence in the Eighteenth Century 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), 115. 
 3 
same time the colony was embroiled in a bitter and long lasting dispute with neighboring 
Massachusetts.  Years of litigation, claims, and counter-claims occurred as they battled 
for possession of a collection of small towns located near eastern Rhode Island and 
southeastern Massachusetts. 
 Given this context of war, vulnerability, and growth, a study of Rhode Island 
during this period raises several questions.  For instance, how did the smallest of the 
British North American mainland colonies wage war? What motivated its people and 
government to involve themselves in seemingly non-local, imperial conflicts? How did 
this nearly decade long period of violence shape society? Whether in terms of threats or 
growth, I will argue that Rhode Island’s involvement in this period of imperial warfare 
was characterized by self-interest on a variety of levels.  The government’s military 
plans, the expansion of provincial power, attempts to raise expeditionary forces, the use 
of privateers, and the indirect participation of non-combatants all depict a colonial society 
very interested in its own local political and economic interests. Although literally 
“provincial,” these interests exhibit the Atlantic and global networks that the smallest of 
the New England colonies was situated in. These two different sets of concerns, the 
political and economic, sometimes clashed and at other times combined as politicians, 
merchants, sailors, soldiers, and citizens participated in the dual conflicts.  The War of 
Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s War may have been imperial in origin, but personal and 
colonial interests were paramount to regional New England and imperial British 
concerns. 
The engagement of these questions and the ensuing study of Rhode Island society 
at war between the years of 1739 and 1748 are worthy of consideration because of the 
 4 
numerous broader issues they touch upon.  Firstly, it illuminates the response of an 
individual colony to an imperial war.  From the mid seventeenth century up until the 
1760s, Britain’s mainland North American colonies were pulled into a series of wars, 
imperial in origin, which presented the colonies with a variety of economic and security 
problems.  Secondly, this study of a society at war highlights the importance of 
examining the role of violence in the history of colonial America.  As one scholar has 
aptly put it: “colonial North American history was not created in peace and interrupted by 
wars; wars, rumors of war, and costs of war affected every generation of Amerindians 
and colonists.”4 For Rhode Island, the violence of the dual conflicts presented its self in 
the form constant rumors of raid and invasion, only materializing in the shape of roving 
privateers off of the coast and far-flung expeditions to French Canada the Spanish West 
Indies. Despite the seemingly intangible nature of this sort of violence, government 
institutions, armed forces, and society as a whole still experienced and responded to the 
demands and impacts of nearly a decade of war. Thirdly, this study provides an 
interesting case study, providing a glimpse of a colony and region in flux.  No longer a 
series of scattered settlements based upon religious motives, Rhode Island of the mid-
eighteenth century was developing into a “Yankee” society, characterized by urban 
centers and expanding commerce.  Lastly, the subject matter its self, Rhode Island and 
the overlapping conflicts of the War of Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s War, have 
received little to no coverage in recent publications and research.  These areas deserve 
attention in order to form a clearer and more complete picture of colonial society and the 
wars and violence that shaped it. 
                                                 
4
 Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), i. 
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An examination of Rhode Island at war during this period of time draws upon two 
different historiographies: that of the study of colonial Rhode Island and the other 
concerned with colonial warfare.  The body of literature concerned with the colony is 
relatively small, perhaps not totally surprising given the consistent focus upon the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony by historians of colonial America. All too often the history of 
Massachusetts has been conflated with the history of New England. This has created what 
Connecticut historian Walter Woodward has dubbed “blind spots,” holes in the 
historiography of early New England that have failed to take into account occurrences of 
inter-colonial conflict, among other issues.5  Furthermore, many of the histories of the 
Rhode Island colony cover the early period of settlement and establishment with an 
emphasis on the colony’s founder, Roger Williams, and themes of religion and 
community.6 Given the colony’s unique policy of religious toleration, the focus on such 
topics at the expense of others can hardly be considered surprising. 
However, there have been several works dealing with the colony during the time 
period in question, the mid-eighteenth century, the most comprehensive of which is 
Sydney V. James’ magisterial Colonial Rhode Island: A History.7 James provides a 
thorough history of the colony spanning from the early foundations up until the 
independence of what became known as the United States.  He covers a variety of topics 
                                                 
5
 Walter S. Woodward, Prospero’s America: John Winthrop, Jr., Alchemy, and the Creation of New 
England Culture, 1606-1676 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 91. 
6
 For some examples of studies in this area see: Sydney V. James, John Clarke and his Legacies: Religion 
and Law in Colonial Rhode Island, 1368-1750, ed. Theodore Dwight Bozeman (University Park, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Carl Bridenbaugh, Fat, Mutton and Liberty of Conscience: 
Society in Rhode Island, 1636-1690 (Providence: Brown University Press, 1974); Edmund S. Morgan, 
Roger Williams: The Church and the State (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007); Edwin S. Gaustad, 
Liberty of Conscience: Roger Williams in America (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1999); Alison G. 
Olson, “Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and the Question of Religious Diversity in Colonial New England,” 
The New England Quarterly 65, No. 1 (March 1992), 93-116. 
7
 Sydney V. James, Colonial Rhode Island: A History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975).  Sydney 
V. James was a historian at the University of Iowa and was the preeminent scholar of colonial Rhode 
Island. Some of his works were later edited and published after his death in 1993. 
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such as religion, politics, society, and imperial war.  In regards to the imperial wars, and 
King George’s War in particular, James argues that these conflicts served to draw the 
colony into a closer orbit around the imperial metropole while bringing about the 
deleterious issues of death, loss of commerce, tarnished reputation, debt, and political 
division.8  
Only two monographs have been published in the last twenty-five years that 
directly deal with the social history of the colony in the 1740s: Lynne Withey’s Urban 
Growth in Colonial Rhode Island and James’ posthumously published The Colonial 
Metamorphoses in Colonial Rhode Island: A Study of Institutions in Change.9 Mention of 
war and the military is conspicuously absent from both studies.  In her examination of 
urban growth and change in colonial Newport and Providence, Withey argues that the 
two cities provide a valuable case study in which to examine the relationship between 
economic expansion and society, the dynamics of urban growth and decline, and the 
effects of the American Revolution on two different cities.  She illuminates the impact of 
economic development and urbanization upon society, paying special attention to issues 
of poverty/transients, ethnic diversity, the dominance of mercantile elites, and Rhode 
Island’s commercial ties with the West Indies and Britain.  James’ study of changing 
institutions focuses on both local and colonial government, ecclesiastical organizations, 
and nongovernmental entities such as lotteries and colleges. He concludes that Rhode 
Island evolved from a delicate collection of settlements concerned with religion to a 
society whose institutions were fully shaped by a colonial government largely free of 
                                                 
8
 Ibid, 274-5, 293. 
9
 Sydney V. James, The Colonial Metamorphoses in Colonial Rhode Island: A Study of Institutions in 
Change, eds. Sheila Skemp and Bruce Daniels (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2000). 
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British interference and characterized by the consent of the governed, eventually 
achieving its “own tradition” by 1776.10  
The second historiography in question, dealing with the colonial wars, is much 
more thoroughly fleshed out than the recent studies of Rhode Island have been.  
Influenced by the post-Second World War rise of “the new military history,” the 
expansion of martial studies to include social factors, a variety of works and research 
have studied the relationship between war and society in early America.  In addition to 
studying the impact of wars on a given society, scholars have also shed light on the 
characteristics of participant societies by way of examining how war was waged. 
Although the bulk of these works have been concerned with the experience of the 
American Revolution11, a significant number have looked at the colonies, with much 
attention directed toward New England in particular.  Fred Anderson’s A People's Army: 
Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War12 is an excellent example of 
the application of the war and society methodology.  He is concerned with the impact of a 
shared event, service in the French and Indian War, upon a large group of ordinary men.  
By focusing on the wartime experience, assessment by British officers, makeup of 
armies, and accounts of common soldiers, Anderson is able to discern the morals, 
discipline, religion, and provincial worldview of these troops.   
                                                 
10
 Ibid, 242-6, 255. 
11
 For examples of war and society histories regarding the American Revolution, see Charles Neimeyer, 
America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army (New York: New York University Press, 
1997); Carol Berkin, Founding Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America’s Independence (New York: 
Vintage, 2006); John Resch and Walter Sargent, Eds., War and Society in the American Revolution: 
Mobilization and Home Fronts (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006); Jacqueline Barber 
Carr, After the Siege: A Social History of Boston, 1775-1800 (Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press, 
2004). 
12
 Fred Anderson, A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984). 
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Other studies have been in the same vein but utilized different temporal and 
geographic spans.  Richard Melvoin used a single community, Deerfield, Massachusetts, 
as a case study spanning from 1670 until 1729 to chronicle the impact of nearly constant 
threat and war upon the development of frontier society.13  Harold Selesky’s War & 
Society in Colonial Connecticut is even more ambitious, examining the experience and 
makeup of that colony’s armies while also looking at how the colonial government dealt 
with the problem of war from the seventeenth century up until the eve of the 
Revolution.14 He concludes that war was the most “difficult and expensive” problem 
faced by Connecticut, despite its relative safety and stability as the New England frontier 
moved toward the north and west.  As war became less about the survival of the colony 
and more about proving imperial allegiance, fighting as a collective concern gave way to 
economic enterprise in which self-interest and professional soldiering replaced 
impressments and universal militias.15 As will be discussed in the ensuing study, this 
trend was certainly at work in Rhode Island, perhaps to an even greater extent.  The most 
recent addition to this body of literature is Kyle Zelner’s A Rabble in Arms: 
Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip's War, a work that gains insight 
into the society of late seventeenth century Essex county by examining who was chosen 
to be impressed into service and why.16  He argues against the historical myth that the 
New England soldiers in the colonial wars were representative cross-sections of society.  
Instead, militia committees selected those on the margins of their towns, men who were 
                                                 
13
 Richard I. Melvoin, New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1989). 
14
 Harold E. Selesky, War & Society in Colonial Connecticut (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
15
 Ibid, 242-3. 
16
 Kyle F. Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip's War (New 
York: New York University Press, 2009). 
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almost always unmarried, landless, loosely employed, and sometimes criminals. By 
mandating that certain types of men go off to war, militia committees that were made up 
of town notables tried to reinforce stability, piety, and family.17 
In addition to the historiography concerned with war and culture is a related, 
much more conventional branch of study interested in the ways in which the waging of 
colonial war developed over time.  Some of these works provide insight into the conflicts 
in question by providing a context for the soldiers and sailors of Rhode Island. In order to 
fully understand a particular conflict, it is important to be aware of particulars such as the 
types of forces, tactics, and hardships involved.  Ian K. Steele’s Warpaths: Invasion of 
North America is a highly influential study that chronicles the interaction and conflict 
between North American colonists and Native Americans over a nearly two hundred year 
period of time.  In regards to the conflicts of the 1740s, Steele depicts them as being the 
last in a long series of inconclusive colonial showdowns between Britain and France.  
The indecisive nature of King George’s War is the result of European British forces 
being largely absent from operations such as the Louisbourg expedition.  Instead, he 
posits that this period was a sort of highpoint for colonial arms, during which time war 
empowered colonial legislatures and was largely commercial in nature, appealing to 
material self-interest in the shape of bounties, plunder rights, and supplies.18 In the case 
of Rhode Island, the government eagerly appealed to such monetary concerns in order to 
staff forts, man the colony sloop, and fill out and later reinforce expeditionary infantry 
companies. Guy Chet provides a much more critical appraisal of colonial martial 
performance.  By treating each war as a separate case and analyzing the successes and 
                                                 
17
 Ibid, 9. 
18
 Steele, Warpaths, 135-6.  For the argument that the Louisbourg expedition was a “pinnacle” of colonial 
arms, see also, Selesky, War & Society in Colonial Connecticut, 74-96. 
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failures of provincial arms, he argues that the American colonists were most successful 
when employing European tactics.  In doing so, he attacks the myths that European-style 
warfare was ineffective in North America, colonial innovations were a departure from 
European doctrines, and warfare alienated the colonies from the metropole.19 
After considering these historiographies it becomes apparent that significant holes 
exist in each one.  In the case of the most recent body of scholarship specifically 
interested in the society of Rhode Island in the eighteenth century, there is a deficiency in 
the coverage given to the incessant colonial wars.20  Likewise, the colony of Rhode Island 
is almost always absent from the historiography of colonial war and society.21 This study 
will contribute to these bodies of literature by articulating the often overlooked and 
misunderstood role of Rhode Island, the wars of 1739-1748, and their relationship to 
society.  Rhode Island may not have contributed quantitatively to the military expeditions 
in the same way Massachusetts, Connecticut or even New Hampshire did, but it was not 
for want of trying. It should be noted that its participation far exceeded that of the much 
larger middle and southern colonies such as Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and the 
Carolinas.  While wars of survival such as King Philip’s War or massive imperial 
endeavors like the French and Indian War more clearly mobilized larger New England 
                                                 
19
 Guy Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Northeast 
(Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).  The issue of whether or not colonial warfare was 
European or uniquely Americanized has been contested by a number of scholars. For a recent rebuttal to 
the argument of the triumph of European warfare, see John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War 
Making on the Frontier, 1604-1814 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
20
 For the lone book-length work directly concerned with Rhode Island and King George’s War, see 
Howard M. Chapin, Rhode Island Privateers in King George’s War, 1739-1748 (Providence: the Rhode 
Island Historical Society, 1926). Chapin provides a thoroughly researched narrative and history of a 
multitude of privateering vessels. 
21
 When Rhode Island does receive mention it is usually in a negative way, for instance Chet points out 
what he perceives as the lack of participation of the colony during the Louisbourg expedition: “some 
colonies-Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and, of course, Rhode Island-did not deliver the men and material that 
they had promised…” Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 103. His overview of the siege leaves 
out Rhode Island’s belated contribution the garrison and the pivotal role of the colony sloop in the initial 
invasion convoy. 
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populations and affected society, the seemingly heavily commercialized warfare of King 
George’s War and the War of Jenkins’ Ear is just as worthy of study for what it can tell 
us about the years between tentative settlement and more established society in New 
England.  Moreover, upon further examination the commercial nature of warfare, which 
relied on incentives such as privateering and bounties, certainly has its explanatory limits.  
It does not fully illuminate the manner in which Rhode Islanders considered the wars.  
Commercial warfare not only failed in many instances to fill the colony’s troop quotas 
but it is only one component of the self-interest displayed by the colony and colonists.  
What the historiographies colonial Rhode Island and colonial American warfare leave out 
is that Rhode Islanders felt legitimately threatened by the prospect of French raids or 
invasion and therefore handled the war just as much, if not more, in terms of self-defense 
than as a means of imperial participation. 
In order to explore the commercial and provincial interest of a society at war, I 
will be examining different segments of that society in order to show how far a seemingly 
minor pair of wars permeated.  In order to analyze colonial vulnerability, government 
actions and concerns, the makeup and experience of Rhode Island’s infantry companies, 
the role of privateering, and the impact on the non-combatant population, I will be 
utilizing a variety of primary sources.  In terms of the interests and motivations of the 
colonial government, I draw heavily from published collections of assembly records and 
the various governors’ correspondence. I also incorporate unpublished archival materials 
such as petitions to the provincial legislature and the records of the war councils.  In 
order to gain an understanding of how this period of warfare impacted society, it is 
important to examine the makeup and experience of the companies of troops that were 
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sent on the expeditions to Cuba and South America and later Louisbourg in French 
Atlantic Canada.  Like scholars of colonial warfare and society such as Anderson, Zelner, 
and Selesky, I have attempted to piece together portraits of the leadership and common 
soldiery by identifying these men on published muster rolls and lists and then 
investigating their pre and post-war lives. The last part of my argument will move beyond 
the government and combatants and examine the larger society as a whole.  While 
perhaps the most difficult correlation to ascertain, much can be gleaned from religious 
records, colonial laws, and the government’s issuance of payments to individuals. 
 My argument will be arranged by paying attention to each one of the above-
mentioned segments of society.  I will start with an overview of the state of the Colony of 
Rhode Island at this time, showing the ways in which it had grown, developed, and 
stabilized from its initial tenuous settlement and founding.  By the middle part of the 
eighteenth century, the colony was connected to Europe, the West Indies, Africa, and the 
Atlantic seaboard through a multitude of trade connections and imperial loyalties. 
However I will also highlight the territorial, political, social, and military instability of 
New England’s smallest colony.  By 1739 Rhode Island could still be considered a 
frontier, albeit an exposed maritime one. Given the colony’s heavy involvement in 
maritime commerce, small land mass, and exposure to the sea, this frontier could be 
every bit as dangerous and disconcerting as those more conventional frontiers in northern 
and western New England.  From there I will turn to the colonial government, namely the 
Assembly and governorship, detailing both their personal and institutional perceptions of 
these vulnerabilities and the ways in which they handled the problem of the wars.  Of 
particular note is the ongoing border struggle with Massachusetts and how wartime 
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policy was aimed just as much at that struggle as the one taking place on Cape Breton 
Island.  Next I will consider the actual fighting forces of Rhode Island, looking at not 
only the imperial expeditions and freebooting privateers, but also the war effort at home 
that included the construction of a colony sloop and manning of a fortress in Newport, 
Fort George.  While the former two forces were heavily involved in monetary rewards, 
the latter two elements were wrapped up in a very different sort of self-interest concerned 
with territorial and maritime security.  The last section will deal with the relationship 
between war and the general, non-combatant Rhode Island society.  Whether dealing with 
prisoners, impressing soldiers and sailors, providing provisions, billeting troops, 
observing curfew, or constructing military structures, a large number of Rhode Islanders 
were touched by war during this time. 
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Chapter 1: Growth and Vulnerability: The State of Colonial Rhode Island in the 
Mid-Eighteenth Century 
 
 In order to identify and fully appreciate the different forms of self-interest that 
characterized Rhode Island’s participation in the dual conflicts it is necessary to depict 
the state of the colony as it was at the eve of war in 1739. Economically and 
demographically, the portrait of Rhode Island is one characterized by growth and 
expansion, a society heavily commercial and on the move. However, beneath this 
seemingly robust surface there were several vulnerabilities, causes for concern in regards 
to security, both political and territorial. These exposures to not only France and Spain, 
but also neighboring Massachusetts and the imperial metropole, would come to the 
forefront as the colony was thrust into two conflicts as the result of machinations taking 
place far across the Atlantic. 
 
Growth in Mid-Century Rhode Island 
 
 By 1739, the merchants of Rhode Island had found a profitable niche for 
themselves in the lucrative transatlantic trade system that connected the continents of 
North America, Europe, and Africa. The bulk of the colony’s trade was with the West 
Indies; in 1739 roughly two-thirds of all Rhode Island merchant shipping traded in the 
Caribbean. This trade had become routine during the early years of the eighteenth century 
and by 1742, Newport eclipsed Boston in terms of commerce with the West Indies.  
Initially, Rhode Island merchants concentrated on providing provisions for plantation 
colonies such as Jamaica and Barbados. As trade expanded and Rhode Island’s limited 
agricultural output could not keep up with demand, the colony’s merchants began 
procuring foodstuffs and exportable commodities, such as lumber and fish, from other 
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continental colonies. Merchants engaged in a diverse coastal trade, purchasing items like 
fish from Newfoundland, flour from Baltimore, and grains from Long Island and 
Connecticut, positioning themselves as middlemen. During the 1720s, ships hailing from 
Newport, and to a lesser degree Providence, became more and more tied to the slave 
trade, transporting slaves from sub-Saharan Africa to the plantation colonies in the West 
Indies and southern North America. These slaves were purchased with rum that was 
distilled in Rhode Island from West Indian sugar and sold to slave traders who highly 
prized the commodity. During the 1740s, Rhode Islanders made over fifty slave voyages 
to African ports, carrying back almost six thousand slaves, mostly destined for the 
plantation colonies in the West Indies and southern North America. The Caribbean 
provisions and slave trade was dominated by a group of elite mercantile families, such as 
the Wantons, Malbones, Ayraults, and Redwoods. It was also during this time that trade 
with Britain began to become more routine and prosperous. Finished manufacture and 
luxuries were imported from the metropole in exchange for goods and cash obtained from 
exchanges with other colonies, such as Nantucket whale oil, Carolina tobacco, and 
Caribbean sugar.22 
 It should be noted that a significant portion of the West Indian trade operated 
outside the law, circumventing laws such as the Molasses Act and various Navigation 
Acts, which attempted to confine colonial trade to only British controlled ports with only 
British/Anglo-American ships and cargoes. Shrewd Rhode Island merchants recognized 
the opportunities that existed to trade with off-limits French and Spanish Caribbean 
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islands, where foodstuffs, provisions, and sugar could all be exchanged outside Britain’s 
poorly enforced mercantile system.23 This illegal commerce would persist during times of 
war, with the colony’s merchants clandestinely trading with the French and Spanish sugar 
islands during the conflict, complicating the loyalty between colony and metropole. 
Politically, smuggling would become a major source of tension between Britain and the 
colonial merchants at the end of the Seven Years War with France in 1763. As 
policymakers in London began a concentrated campaign against illegal trade, Rhode 
Island led the way in protesting invigorated enforcement, reacting violently to the Sugar 
Act of 1764 and burning the customs schooner Gaspee in 1772. Smuggling was largely 
responsible for creating an affluent class of colonial merchants that was equipped with a 
substantial merchant marine. Their extralegal economic activities and interests were 
congruent with the calls for political independence that characterized the turbulent years 
between the last great imperial war and the American Revolution.24 As one legal scholar 
has remarked, “in Rhode Island, notably, commerce and politics were so inextricably 
mingled that rum and liberty were but different liquors from the same still.”25 
Their lack of qualms about illicit trade, paired with their ability to procure trade 
goods throughout British North America, allowed Rhode Island’s merchants to play a 
major roll in the West Indian provisioning trade and outright dominate the American 
slave trade. By the mid-eighteenth century Rhode Island merchants “out-Yankeed” 
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competing colonial merchants in Massachusetts and beyond, more than making up for 
their colony’s relatively meager resources and hinterland.26 
 The urbanization that characterized Rhode Island in the mid 1700s was the result 
of the colony’s emergence as a major trade hub. The mostly urban nature of the relatively 
small colony significantly differentiated it from its New England neighbors; Connecticut 
was principally agrarian and rural with only a few small port towns, whereas 
Massachusetts contained one major city, Boston, and a large hinterland dotted with towns 
such as Marblehead and Pittsfield, while mountainous and rustic New Hampshire 
contained no real urban center. By 1748, the population of the colony was around 32,000, 
having doubled in a mere eighteen years. Of this total, some 13,000 people lived in the 
cities of Newport and Providence, meaning that almost half of the colony’s inhabitants 
dwelled within these two urban centers. This urban population was split almost evenly 
between Newport and Providence, with the former containing a little less than a thousand 
more inhabitants than the latter.27 During the period in question, Newport and Providence 
were interdependent yet competing for commercial and political dominance of the 
colony. In the 1740s, Newport still reigned supreme but was in the midst of slowly but 
surely being overtaken by its rival on the northern edge of the Narragansett Bay, an 
usurpation that would play out over the next two decades.28 During the conflicts of 1739-
1748, Newport was still the fifth largest town in British North America. The port town 
seems to have made a favorable impression upon the illustrious traveler, Doctor 
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Alexander Hamilton, who noted its scenic harbor and countryside, “handsome” Colony 
House, impressive merchant mansions, and remarkably “pretty women.”29  
Providence, which lay further up the Narragansett Bay, was at this time “a 
[relatively] small but long town, situated close upon the water, upon rocky ground.”30 
Despite its smaller population and subordination to Newport, Providence was an 
important regional economic and political center with its own port and community of 
merchants. Providence was heavily involved in the inter-colonial trade but was dependent 
upon Newport for most foreign imports.31  
 Despite Rhode Island’s preponderance of city and large-town dwellers, there 
existed a small but noteworthy pastoral section of the colony in Kings County and the 
western portions of Providence and Newport counties. Portions of the Narragansett 
country were also dedicated to agriculture. Towns such as Westerly, Scituate, Kingston, 
Exeter, and Warwick were home to a mixture of small farms and miniature plantations. 
These small plantations would usually employ less than fifty slaves, allowing a small 
minority of elite white families to live a lifestyle similar to that of a Virginia planter; they 
were usually Anglican, pursued “rustic amusements,” such as hunting and fishing, and 
partook in a culture of hospitality and socializing.32  The Narragansett country was home 
to over 800 slaves, making it the “largest pocket of bound labor” in the whole of New 
England. Rhode Island agriculture benefited from favorable climate and soil, nurturing 
grains, wood products, cattle, and horses that went to market in Newport, Providence, and 
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abroad.33 Rural Rhode Island was also home to a significant Narragansett Indian 
population. It numbered over 500 people and was mostly located near Charlestown and 
the southwest of the colony. A “prince,” an inherited position that was often wracked 
with corruption, headed this community. Likewise, the surviving Indians of Rhode Island 
were often plagued by servitude and poverty, engaged in a futile cycle of debt and 
indentured labor in order to settle debts owed to whites.34 
 For the colony as a whole, the period leading up to and including the dual 
conflicts was one of growth. This expansion of population and commerce can be seen in 
the variety and number of infrastructure projects that were approved by the colony’s 
legislature, the General Assembly. For instance, “sundry” petitioners pressured the 
government to lengthen a “highway” that went from Providence to Warwick in 1742. In 
1740, the freemen of North Kingstown successfully petitioned to have their town’s 
country road widened so that two carts would be able to pass each other at the same time. 
Furthermore, a new highway was constructed between that town and East Greenwich to 
accommodate traffic between the two locales.35 Colonists were also easing their travel by 
constructing several new bridges as growth led to more and more instances of taming 
geographical barriers. Among these new structures was the Pawtucket Bridge in 
Providence, constructed in 1741, the Point Bridge in Newport which was ordered to be 
completed in 1736, and a lottery funded bridge over the Weybosset river in 1745.36 The 
demand for increased mobility also extended to the colony’s numerous waterways as an 
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increasing amount of commerce and population needed to access the multitude of islands 
within Narragansett Bay and the colony’s mainland. The bottleneck at South Kingstown 
(on the mainland) serves an example of the need for more ferries. The pre-existing boats 
and ferries that were used to access Jamestown (on an island in the Bay) were deemed 
“insufficient” to cope with the recent increase in “inhabitants, trade, and commerce”; they 
were often “crowded with men, women, children, horses, hogs, sheep, and cattle,” 
creating an “intolerable inconvenience, annoyance, and delay of men and business.” As a 
result, the General Assembly allowed for the creation of a new ferry, as it had done time 
and time again throughout the watery byways of the colony.37 
 Population growth in the late 1730s and 1740s also led to the creation of new 
towns from older ones that had grown too unwieldy and decentralized. In 1738, the town 
of Westerly in the southwest corner of the colony was divided, resulting in the creation of 
Charlestown. Likewise, West Greenwich was created from the western portion of East 
Greenwich in the spring of 1741, Coventry from the western part of Warwick, and the 
division of the western section of North Kingstown in March of 1742 established 
Exeter.38 The locations of these new polities indicate the movement and growth of 
populations in a westward direction. New towns were needed away from the immediate 
shores of Narragansett Bay, the location of the colony’s earliest settlements, as colonists 
spread to once rural areas in search of more land and new commercial opportunities. The 
incorporation of these new towns also resulted in the creation of new political openings. 
Positions such as justices of the peace, militia officers, and legislators, were often 
opportunities for advancement for men who had been excluded or stymied in their 
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original towns. For instance, Robert Greene, of Warwick, was a relatively obscure citizen 
in 1740. However, as Robert Greene of Coventry, he became a lieutenant of militia, 
justice of the peace, and deputy in the General Assembly, all within a five-year span of 
the creation of his new town.39 
 
Rhode Island’s Vulnerabilities 
  
 Commercial, political, and demographic growth was not without its downsides; 
not everyone could be a Robert Greene. As the population climbed and Newport and 
Providence urbanized, poverty and the presence of transients also increased. The number 
of poor relief cases climbed in both Providence and Newport during the 1730s and 1740s. 
The rise in poverty in Newport was the most dramatic. While there were only fourteen 
instances of poor relief in the 1730s, there were over one hundred such cases in the 
following decade. Poor relief was usually administered to resident dependents such as 
widows, single women, and children, and took the form of boarding, payment of 
expenses, and apprenticeships.40 The transient poor were also a major concern. Although 
the lure of commercial opportunities in Newport and Providence for laborers, sailors, and 
artisans sometimes delivered jobs, other times these chances proved to be hollow. Not 
everyone could share in the colony’s prosperity and those with limited means were less 
likely to multiply their wealth in comparison to already relatively secure merchants. As a 
result, the numbers of transient poor in the colony’s two urban centers rose dramatically 
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after the 1720s. Providence, which only identified ten such cases between 1721 and 1730, 
dealt with sixty-four transients in the 1730s alone. Transients were usually ordered to 
leave town after the town council had determined their non-resident status. Sometimes 
they were allowed to stay if someone else was able to pay a bond that would go toward 
their financial assistance in the future if it were needed.41 
 Rhode Island’s vulnerabilities went beyond the presence of transient and resident 
poor, which required government supervision and represented an unstable element of 
society. It also extended to the territorial and political security of the colony. The 
colony’s strong orientation toward the sea, both geographically and economically, was 
both a boon and a liability. This littoral characterization of a large part of the colony 
acted as a permeable frontier for some and a border of separation from the unknown to 
others. A theorist of the littoral, Michael Pearson, has argued that shore societies should 
be considered dissimilar from their inland counterparts, as they are distinctly amphibious, 
operating between the land and sea on a regular basis.42 This notion held true for the 
colony’s merchants, sailors, ship captains, and other maritime denizens; shores were the 
site of smuggling, transportation, and the movement of cargoes, both material and human. 
On the other hand, the littoral was the cause for a great deal of fear. Culturally, the sea 
and shore were often depicted as perilous, loaded with the potential dangers of storms, 
pirates, navigational hazards, and raids. Puritan ministers, who were certainly present in 
Rhode Island’s sectarian jumble, depicted the ocean as a moral, and worldly threat to 
both morality and social order.43 In this sense, the coast could be considered to be what 
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maritime historian Greg Dening has theorized: “frontiers and boundaries” that partition 
between “good and bad, familiar and strange.”44 As a result, Rhode Island should be 
considered part of a highly vulnerable New England frontier that stretched from the Long 
Island Sound, around Cape Code and the nearby islands, and up the coasts of New 
Hampshire and Maine. Militarily, and by extension politically, this frontier is often 
overlooked in the context of the imperial wars of colonial America.  
The colony of Rhode Island in particular, contemporarily known as the “ocean 
colony,” perhaps had the most to lose in such geography. The most exposed point of the 
colony was certainly Block Island, measuring less than ten square miles in size and 
thirteen miles off the coast of Rhode Island. In the 1740s, it was home to roughly 300 
inhabitants45, a collection of small farms, and a shaky pier. Some fifty years earlier, 
during King William’s War, the island had been a site of much fear and violence. French 
ships held inhabitants as captives, raiding parties slaughtered cattle and razed farms, and 
privateers menaced the island’s meagerly protected shores. The need for a “timely 
defense” would still be fresh in the islanders’ minds in 1739.46 The need to protect Block 
Island would be one of the major demands on the provincial government at the outbreak 
of war.  
 In addition, Newport was also in harm’s way. All that stood between the town, its 
harbor, and the perils of a militarized sea was a small peninsula and Goat Island. 
Although this island contained a fortress, Fort George, the structure had fallen into a state 
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of disrepair between Queen Anne’s War and 1739. Dr. Hamilton remarked on the sorry 
state of the harbor’s defenses in 1744:  
While I stayed in this place they sent in several valuable prizes, but, 
notwithstanding this warlike apparatus abroad, they are but very sorrily 
fortified at home. The rocks in their harbour are the best security; for the 
fort, which stands upon an island, about a mile from the town, is the 
futilest thing of that nature ever I saw. It is a building of near 200 feet 
square, of stone and brick, the wall being about fifteen feet high, with a 
bastion and watchtower on each corner, but so exposed to cannon shot that 
it could be battered about their ears in ten minutes. A little distance from 
this fort is a battery of seventeen or eighteen great guns.47 
 
The town’s accessibility was both beneficial and problematic. Easy access to the sea 
meant that navigation was usually possible during inclement weather, allowing the port to 
thrive as a “trans-shipment center,” providing valuable income in the form of docking 
fees and warehousing. However this unusual geography not only resulted in the lack of a 
large agricultural hinterland but also a precarious security situation.48 This combination 
of exposed geography and under-preparedness contrasts greatly with the fortifications 
and more naturally protected harbors of New York City and Boston. Like these cities, 
Newport was a prosperous seaport, fueled by an “entrepreneurial headquarters effect” 
that spun off a variety of related urban businesses such as insurance, shipbuilding, 
finance, and other nautical enterprises.49 It is also the gateway to the rest of the 
Narragansett Bay, leading all the way up to Providence. Britain’s declaration of war 
against imperial Spain and the later entry of France plunged this exposed town, its 
strategic waterway, and commercial prosperity into nearly a decade of high risk. Like 
Block Island, the merchants and inhabitants had the most to lose during the dual conflicts. 
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Their petitions and pleas for increased security would weigh heavy upon the ears of 
provincial government. 
 Rhode Island’s territorial vulnerability went beyond the threats of the obvious 
enemies of France and Spain. It also included the machinations of its neighbor to the 
north and east, Massachusetts. Ever since its founding and initial settlement in the first 
half of the seventeenth century Rhode Island was exposed to the threat of absorption or 
annexation into either Connecticut or Massachusetts. These threats began with the initial 
Narragansett Proprietors, a group of landowners composed of men from Boston, 
Connecticut, and Plymouth who began to buy up lands around the bay beginning in 
1658.50 Territorial uneasiness would continue as both the Plymouth Colony to the east 
and Connecticut to the west made claims to lands reserved for Rhode Island in its royal 
charter. Such border disputes provided a great deal of anxiety for the provincial 
government and consumed large amounts of time and money.51 In 1741, a number of 
provincial elites traveled to the remote forested northwestern corner of Rhode Island to 
determine if a pile of stones that served as the border marker was still in existence. Upon 
discovering that it had been removed, they and some twenty other men created a new 
heap of rocks and carved their initials into a nearby tree to commemorate their presence. 
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They were careful to provide a precise description of this tree, a white pine, so that it 
could be spotted in case of further issues.52 
After the Plymouth colony was merged into Massachusetts in 1691, officials in 
Boston turned their gaze to the contested boundary they had inherited, struggling to retain 
control of a strip of land bordering the Narragansett Bay and the Attleboro Gore, which 
lies east of the Blackstone River. This seemingly diminutive area was home to several 
towns, such as Tiverton, Bristol, Cumberland, and Little Compton, containing over 4,500 
people. Tax revenues from these locales totaled £745 in the year 1747, surpassing the 
contribution of Providence and almost approaching that of Newport. Furthermore, the 
Attleboro Gore contained ore deposits that were smelted into pig iron and used to make 
small cannons, bullets, and other munitions during the dual conflicts. 53 Bristol was also a 
valuable prize due to its active port and involvement in the lucrative slave trade. The 
events surrounding the long-lasting dispute between the two colonies came to a head in 
the 1730s and 1740s, coinciding with the War of Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s War. 
During the conflicts, Bristol would be a major point of contention between the 
government of Rhode Island and Massachusetts Governor William Shirley. His efforts to 
impress soldiers in the volatile borderland resulted in a “riot” in the autumn of 1744 and 
the subsequent flight of impressed persons, continuing into the following spring. Shirley 
and his officials were certain that these men absconded to and were being sheltered in 
Rhode Island, a charge refuted by the Ocean Colony.54 Richard Partridge, Rhode Island’s 
tireless advocate in London, was involved in the legal wrangling over the border for 
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twelve years, from 1734 until 1746. In 1741, a royal commission composed of 
representatives from Nova Scotia, New York, and New Jersey, awarded the Gore to 
Rhode Island and partitioned the disputed eastern Narragansett lands between the 
colonies. This decision satisfied neither party and led to an appeal by both sides, 
prolonging the decision for several more years, resulting in a confirmation of the original 
1741 decision.55 There was also a mercantile dimension to the tension between the two 
colonial rivals. Thanks to inexpensive bills of credit, Rhode Island traders were able to 
buy up the products of the Massachusetts hinterland and export them to the West Indies, 
effectively outmaneuvering Boston merchants for valuable export commodities in their 
own colony.56 As will be discussed later in this study, the simmering feud between Rhode 
Island and Massachusetts would provide the pivotal context for professions of loyalty and 
the debate over the smaller colony’s war record. 
Besides the ongoing border conflict that was mediated by the metropolitan 
government in Britain, there existed a few other tensions with the home government that 
caused the Rhode Island’s provincial leadership to respond to the years of imperial 
warfare with a calculated loyalty. One of these concerns was the status of the colony’s 
relatively privileged royal charter that had been in existence since 1663. This charter was 
so cherished that it would serve as the basis for Rhode Island’s government until the 
adoption of a state constitution in 1842. Like the colony’s boundaries, the charter would 
come under fire throughout Rhode Island’s history. The charter granted the colony a 
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high-degree of self-rule. Freemen from each town, white protestant males that met certain 
age, property, and wealth qualifications, directly elected legislative deputies to the 
Assembly, towns being allotted representatives based on their size. The position of 
governor was also directly elected, a unique situation that only also existed in 
Connecticut at this time; all other colonial governorships were royally appointed. Church 
and state were explicitly separated. As a result, the colony developed a political culture 
based on localism and libertarianism, cultivating arguably “the strongest democratic spirit 
and practice in Anglo-America.” The disorganization of the colony’s earlier years gave 
way to a more “reined in” but not erased provincial self-interest in the first quarter of the 
1700s. The desire to demonstrate competent self-government was motivated by fears of 
royal control.57 The lobbyist Partridge saw himself as guardian of the colony’s charter 
privileges, alerting the various governors and General Assembly of any threat to their 
relatively high degree of autonomy. In terms of the years of the dual conflicts, the most 
imminent threat to the provincial prerogative was the efforts of the crown to appoint 
naval officers to oversee the enforcement of the Navigation Acts in 1743. Mercantile 
interests allied with the General Assembly to fight the nomination of Leonard Lockman 
as an Admiralty judge for Rhode Island, an effort that was eventually successful.58 
 Another point of tension between the colony and the metropole was the practice 
of printing paper currency. During the governorship of Samuel Cranston, which began in 
1698 and ended in 1727, paper money began to be printed in order to fill a rising demand 
for currency created by the dramatic rise in commerce.59 The crown and British 
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parliament eventually began to view this practice as detrimental to the imperial economy, 
especially since the printing was mostly unregulated, leading to monetary inflation. In a 
cautionary circular letter that urged the cessation of printing that was sent to the 
governments of Rhode Island, Maryland, and Connecticut in 1739, Rhode Island was 
identified as being the worst offender. Similar to the attempt to more strictly enforce the 
Navigation Acts, the effort to curtail the printing of paper money threatened the smooth 
operation of the provincial economy. Partridge pleaded with members of Parliament to 
forgo legislation that would suppress the printing of money in the colonies, arguing that 
such a ban would be ruinous to the “trade and commerce” of Rhode Island and cause “the 
ruin of many families.” 60 Furthermore, the printing of paper currency backed by new 
taxes was a method that the General Assembly would fall back on time and time again in 
order to fund the extremely high costs associated with the expeditions and civil defense 
of the dual conflicts. In 1740, legislation was introduced in London that would effectively 
end future emissions of paper currency. This law loomed but remained un-passed 
throughout the 1740s. However, the atmosphere of monetary threat and scrutiny was 
cited as one of the major reasons why the provincial government hesitated in emitting an 
even larger sum for the expedition to conquer Louisbourg. There was also an intra-New 
England element to the debate. “Some of the Massachusetts people,” namely Governor 
Shirley, were opposed to Rhode Island’s loose monetary policies due to the circulation of 
bills across colonial borders.61 
 Lastly, another legislative threat originating in Britain, the Iron Bill, served as 
another concern for provincial commercial interests. Like the legislation that would 
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curtail the printing of paper money, the Iron Bill would remain an unrealized but never 
the less ominous prospect throughout the years of war. It sought to prohibit the 
manufacture of iron goods in the American colonies in order to bolster to economy of the 
metropole. Although Rhode Island was devoid of any significant iron production, its 
maritime industries and trade certainly benefited from the proximity of cheaper, 
American produced ironware. For example, iron was an important component of 
shipbuilding, an industry that Newport was involved in. Furthermore, the ironworks of 
the Attleboro Gore would be adversely affected if the colony were to successfully pry the 
territory away from Massachusetts. 
 Given this setting of rapid commercial growth juxtaposed with geographic and 
political vulnerability, this study now moves on to examine the response of the provincial 
government to imperial warfare of 1739-1748. The conflicts against Spain, France, and 
Massachusetts tested Rhode Island’s provincial self-interests, in terms of both 
commercial prosperity and territorial security in ways that it had not experienced since 
the volatile years of the colony’s initial founding and would not experience again to such 
a degree until the outbreak of the American Revolution. 
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Chapter 2: The Provincial Government at War: Spain, France, and Massachusetts* 
 The dual conflicts of the War of Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s were the most 
pressing, complicated, and expensive problems that the colony of Rhode Island had to 
deal with between the years of 1739 and 1748. In this regard, the experiences of the 
colonial government were hardly unique; the prominence of war as the major problem of 
the period was experienced by the other New England colonies as well. However, Rhode 
Island’s significantly different interests and form of provincial government would shape 
the unique way in which the smallest of Britain’s mainland colonies handled the burdens 
of involvement in two imperial conflicts. One such interest was the prospect for material 
gains that the declarations of war against Spain and later France brought for enterprising 
merchant communities. “Dazzled by gold to be captured in Spanish ships,” Newport’s 
merchants hastily outfitted privateer vessels and set sail for the West Indies in hopes of 
augmenting their existing trades.62 The response of the colonial government, although 
animated by different motivations, was no less enthusiastic. It should be remembered that 
the colony’s government was rather unique among its North American peers in that its 
charter, which had been held intact since 1663 (with the brief exception of the Dominion 
of New England), allowed for the direct election of the governor and both chambers of 
the legislature, making provincial politicians much more beholden to an electorate of 
local freemen rather than the interests of the British metropolitan government. 
 For the governor, his council of assistants, and the deputies of the legislature, the 
dual conflicts presented threats to the safety and security of the colony while providing a 
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means to express imperial loyalty.  Both of these concerns have not been fully explored 
and analyzed by the past historiography of Rhode Island during the mid-eighteenth 
century. For instance, works interested in King George’s War have either considered 
threats to the New England frontier in a very terrestrial way, focusing on the borderlands 
between New France and the colonies of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire 
or only examined threats and actions at sea in terms of the Louisbourg siege.63 Given 
Rhode Island’s exposed coastal geography and heavy involvement in trade, it should be 
considered to be part of an equally threatened maritime frontier. The actions taken by the 
colonial government over the nine years of conflict reflect this sense of vulnerability, 
depicting institutions that were both responsive to the fears of colonists and genuinely 
concerned in their own right, while at the same time able to significantly increase the 
scope of their power and authority. Paired with the perils of the maritime frontier was the 
desire to prove imperial loyalty and patriotism in a context of political liability. Although 
the most recent definitive history on colonial Rhode Island has alluded to the connection 
between the enthusiastic participation in war and the desire to maintain the privileges 
enjoyed under the royal charter, the most concrete concern of the provincial government 
during this time was the ongoing legal battle for the possession of a series of towns in a 
disputed area on the eastern border with Massachusetts. It is within the terms of this inter-
colonial quarrel that the actions of Rhode Island’s leadership can be better understood. 
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The Institutional Response: Defense Acts, Committees, Charters, and Councils of 
War 
 
Britain officially declared war against Spain on October 23, 1739. It was not until 
the following spring that the declaration publicly posted in Rhode Island. At eleven 
o’clock on April 22, the declaration of war was officially posted at a ceremony at the 
Union Flag Inn, a waterside tavern in Newport. The selection of such a site, with its 
affiliation with the comings and goings of the port city, speaks of the maritime 
orientation that characterized much of the colony’s war effort during the dual conflicts. 
The captains of Newport’s militia companies were in attendance as well as drummers, 
sergeants bearing halberds, and ensigns carrying the flags of the represented militia units. 
In Newport harbor, ships displayed their colors and fired off their guns along with the 
cannons at Fort George located on Goat Island.64 Despite this formal proclamation, the 
legislature had been somewhat involved with the simmering hostilities with the Spanish 
months earlier. For instance, in August of 1739, months before Britain had officially 
announced hostilities, the legislature “loaned” a number of small arms, such as swords 
and pistols, to the eager owners of privateering vessels.65 When considering the 
government response to war it is important to keep in mind that not only were the 
merchants of the colony highly influential in government affairs but were often times 
members of government institutions themselves. Men such as Godfrey Malbone, Walter 
Chaloner, Jonathan Tillinghast, and John Channing, were not only prominent merchants 
and ship owners, but also held elected positions as deputies or were part of the governor’s 
council. Mercantile interests were further conflated with those of the government by the 
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fact that three of the four governors during the period of conflict in question happened to 
be major Newport merchants, John Wanton, Gideon Wanton and Richard Ward.  
Besides the early assistance to some privateers, the institutional response of the 
government took the form of defense acts, the formation of numerous committees, 
charters, and councils of war. The General Assembly, composed of the governor’s 
assistants and deputies proportionally representing each town, passed three major 
comprehensive defense acts. The first of these acts was passed on February 26, 1740. The 
act for the “preservation of the government…in case of an invasion,” manned Fort 
George, dispatched soldiers from the mainland to Block Island for a six month stint, 
ordered the construction of eight new watch houses and five new beacon fire sites on 
strategic coastal positions such as Point Judith and Jamestown, and called for the 
construction of a colony sloop, the ship that would be known as the Tartar.66  
This legislation was augmented almost a year later by a second defense act in 
January of 1741, created to put the colony “at a better posture of defense.” A new powder 
magazine was built in Newport, the Newport militia was re-organized to include two new 
companies, and the defenses at Fort George continued to be worked upon. In addition to 
these measures, the 1741 act took considerable steps towards increasing the powers of the 
provincial government and militarizing Rhode Island society. The power of freemen and 
soldiers to elect their company’s militia officers was nullified and all current officers 
were ordered to step down by the next May.  Instead, the Assembly would annually elect 
the officers of each militia company. Also, militia officers were empowered to add 
supplementary days of training to the minimum four days a year previously mandated by 
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law in order to “discipline the militia and make them expert in the use of their arms.” 
Fines were also raised for those absent from drill or not present during the raising of an 
alarm.67 This act also ended the exemption of the Quaker population from the toils of war 
and defense. The Quakers, who had always been excused from military service due to 
their pacifism, were now required to act as scouts, messengers, or watchmen, remove the 
sick, women, and children from danger, and assist in putting out fires, in the case of an 
alarm. Those refusing were to be fined forty schillings.68 Almost a century of exclusion 
from mandatory service was ended with the stroke of a pen, as the Assembly feared that 
even the assistance of conscientious objectors might be needed on the vulnerable coastal 
frontier.  
 The General Assembly enacted a third and final defense act in June of 1744 when 
the French entered the war on the side of their Spanish allies. An additional ten men were 
to be enlisted at Fort George, impressed if necessary, if not enough were recruited after 
ten days. Barrels of gunpowder were distributed among the fort, Block Island, the Tartar, 
and the county militias. The Tartar was ordered to embark on a defensive coast guard 
action, patrolling from Martha’s Vineyard to the eastern tip of Long Island, a route that 
covered the approach to Rhode Island and skirted the shores of Block Island.69 Such 
defensive cruises were usually undertaken in cooperation with Connecticut’s sloop, the 
Defense. 
 In addition to these defense acts, the General Assembly created a plethora of 
committees that dealt with a variety of aspects of the war effort. Committees were made 
to handle the influx of prisoners taken by the colony’s privateer fleet, audit the expenses 
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of expeditions, procure gunpowder and other supplies from Britain, reorganize militia 
companies, and repair Fort George. These tasks are in no way a complete listing of the 
undertakings of the wartime committees but provide a sampling of the diverse activities 
legislators were involved in. An examination of a preserved written report of a committee 
to the Assembly sheds some light on just what these committees did and who was a part 
of them. On June 19, 1740, the “Committee to Consider what is necessary further to be 
done in Relation to the enlisting of Soldiers for the Expedition against the Spaniards and 
the charge arising thereon” suggested that enlistment cease for the expedition so that 
billeting expenses may be saved. They also recommended that enlistment begin anew by 
the governor and his council if it should seem “necessary for the honour and interest of 
[the] government” in the absence of General Assembly if “fresh advice” were received 
from “Europe or elsewhere.” The committee goes on to suggest that billeting costs may 
be further defrayed by employing the surplus recruits aboard the Tartar. In addition to 
monetary concerns, the committee members were also probably concerned with the 
dissent that the long-term quartering of soldiers could potentially generate as billeting 
was a strain on hosting households. Like most of the legislative committees, it was 
composed of a few men, Colonel John Cranston, Peter Bours, and Thomas Fry, Jr.70 Fry 
was a deputy from East Greenwich and a ship’s captain who would go on to command 
two different privateers during the course of the war. Bours was a prominent politician 
and member of the governor’s council that served in a multitude of different committees 
throughout the war. Colonel Cranston, the most notable of the trio, was a veteran officer 
of Queen Anne’s War, commander at times of both Fort George and the Tartar, and a 
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deputy representing Newport.71 The involvement of such high-profile colonial elites in 
the seemingly mundane matters of a succession of military committees speaks of the 
seriousness in which the General Assembly went about tackling the tasks of war. After 
all, it was elite men such as these that had the most at stake, in terms of both rewards and 
losses, during the years of the dual conflicts. 
Besides legislation and committee action, the legislature also took the opportunity 
to issue its first ever charter to a semi-private organization. In 1741 the Assembly 
bestowed a charter to the Newport Artillery Company, granting it a wide range of 
privileges, including the ability to elect its own officers and exempting its members from 
militia service. The group was composed of Newport elites and its function during the 
dual conflicts appears to have been more ceremonial and social than militaristic. The 
charter “bestowed a traditional sort of favor on members of the ruling element.” The 
granting of such a charter, which went beyond what the petitioning artillerymen had 
originally asked for, also set a precedent that soon allowed for the establishment of an 
identical company in Providence, lotteries, and the establishment of the Redwood Library 
in 1747.72 Previously, the power to grant charters had been limited to royal colonies and 
the British parliament; war provided an opportunity for the colony to test the limits of its 
provincial power. 
 The Governors and their council assistants did not stand idly by and were also 
involved in the preparation of defenses. Councils of war were established that consisted 
of the governor, his council, and the officers of the various militia companies. Like the 
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Assembly, they arranged for and regulated the defense of the colony. For instance, on 
April 21, 1741, armed watches were established in the exposed coastal communities of 
Newport, Jamestown, and Portsmouth, and continuously adjusted in ensuing sessions. 
The councils also voted on the approval of officers of the various expeditions during the 
war, commissioned the captains of the Tartar, nominated recruiters, and sometimes gave 
direct orders to the Tartar, concerning the conflicting needs of convoy duties and 
privateer defense.73 The power of the governor was further boosted in February of 1745 
when the Assembly voted to grant the power of embargo on any and all outgoing ships in 
the case of “any emergent occasion,” 74 a major augmentation of power given the 
colony’s commercial maritime orientation. 
 
Petitions and Threats: The Need for Local Defenses 
 
 The actions of Rhode Island’s colonial government were not purely motivated by 
the self-interests of the elites that composed the governorship, council, and legislative 
deputies, but instead took place in a broader context of constant threat and petitions for 
protection. The specter of invasion and raid was fueled by a stream of rumors and 
sightings that occurred throughout the duration of the dual conflicts. On July 2, 1740, the 
governor and his council considered intelligence they had received regarding the 
expected presence of a Spanish ship off of the coast of the colony.75 Reports of a possible 
Spanish invasion or raid continued during the summer of the next year. In June of 1741, a 
false alarm was raised when throngs of men were observed lighting fires near the town of 
Rockaway on Long Island in the colony of New York. It turned out that these were 
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privateers hailing from New York and Rhode Island that had made landfall to carouse, 
act “rather roughly,” and light bonfires that had burned out of control. Later in the same 
month, the two privateering ships that had been involved in the Long Island incident were 
cruising off of Block Island and sighted a vessel thought to be a Spanish raider. After 
chase was given it was discovered that the ship was actually an American merchant 
vessel.76 
 The entry of the French into the war in 1744 ignited a whole new series of rumors 
and threats that were even more pressing. French Canada was located relatively close to 
the shores and waters of the colony, just past the frontier of Maine, while the nearest 
Spanish outpost was over a thousand miles to the south in Florida. The largest and most 
material of these French threats was the massive fleet assembled by the Duc D’Anville 
that set sail in the autumn of 1746 from France in order to re-conquer Louisbourg and 
ravage the eastern seaboard of occupied Canada and New England. The fleet, consisting 
of 45 transport ships, 3,500 soldiers, over 5,000 sailors, and 15 warships, was believed to 
be headed for Boston before it was devastated by disease and storms.77 The governor of 
Massachusetts, William Shirley, wrote to Governor William Greene of Rhode Island, 
warning him of the threat and encouraging him to dispatch the Tartar to aid in locating 
the fleet.  Citing Rhode Island’s interest, he stated, “this we expect not only as a duty 
your government owe[s] to his Majesty, but also from a principle of self-preservation; for 
if this province should fall into the enemy’s hand, the neighboring provinces shall soon 
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follow.”78 Threats persisted even after D’Anville’s disaster. For instance, on May 21, 
1747, a French privateering schooner posing as a prisoner exchange ship was sighted off 
of Block Island. It was soon chased away and captured as a prize by the Tartar.79 In 
addition to these specific threats and rumors, the colony was especially vulnerable due to 
Newport being an extremely active privateer base. A French spy is reported to have 
written home about the troublesome port city: “perhaps we had better burn it, as a 
pernicious hole, from the number of privateers there fitted out, as dangerous in peace 
as in war…”80 Even Governor Shirley, usually quick to demean his neighbor to the south, 
recognized the colony as a possible target, albeit in terms of his own agenda aimed at 
capturing Louisbourg. Writing to Governor Greene in January of 1745 he remarked, “the 
exposed situation of your colony by sea, and the resentment of the enemy against it, on 
account of the activeness of your privateers, make it particularly probable that you may 
have a sudden visit from the French, this summer, if Cape Breton is not reduced.”81 
Rhode Island’s heavily mercantile and highly mobile maritime society translated into 
offensive efforts during the wars. Ironically, enterprising attacks on enemy shipping that 
originated from the Narragansett Bay put the entire colony at risk; privateering proved to 
be as much of a liability as it was a boon. 
 In addition to threats and rumors, the provincial government was urged into action 
by the pleas and petitions of its citizenry.  These demands for better protection came 
chiefly from two sources: the inhabitants of Block Island and the merchants of Newport. 
That Block Island, the most isolated and vulnerable part of Rhode Island, should petition 
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the Assembly on three different occasions during the years of the dual conflicts should 
hardly be surprising. Before war was officially proclaimed in the colony, some of the 
people of the island pleaded for “a sufficient number of armed men” to be sent to the 
island in order to supplement their relatively small pre-existing militia. Extra protection 
was desired because it was feared, and rightfully predicted, that the war would eventually 
involve the forces of France.82 Although the Assembly heeded this call, the deployment 
of the additional twenty men only lasted for six months. Again, in May of 1741, the 
inhabitants of the exposed island petitioned their government for the return of the 
additional soldiers. They related how the settlement was “in the greatest consternation 
and fear” because they were “plant[ed] on the frontier,” open to an attack by a “cruel and 
barbarous enemy.”83 Despite the sporadic manning of the island by additional troops for 
the duration of the war, the inhabitants and the militia captain of Block Island continued 
to request more soldiers, composing petitions again in March of 1745 and May of 1746.84 
Fears of raids or invasion clearly outweighed any burden that the billeting of additional 
troops may have placed on the small community.  
 The merchants of Newport were also active in lobbying their government for 
increased protection and defense measures. Less isolated than their fellow colonists on 
Block Island, Newport’s business class felt equally vulnerable, fearing that their precious 
harbor and lucrative trade and privateering could be disrupted by a Spanish or French 
incursion. The idea of constructing watch houses on the “frontier” of the colony was first 
raised in a petition to the Assembly dated February 1740. The petitioners, John Gardner 
                                                 
82
 Petitions to the Rhode Island General Assembly, vol. 4, petition 47, Rhode Island State Archives, 
Providence (hereafter abbreviated PRIG, followed by volume number). 
83
 Ibid, petition 108. 
84
 See PRIG V, petition 3, and PRIG IV, petition 26. 
 42 
and Hezekiah Carpenter, both high-ranking officers in the Newport militia, also called for 
the fulltime manning of Fort George, as well as repairs to be made to the structure. 
Efforts were stepped up a year later with the “Petition for the Better Defense of 
Newport,” which was signed by 27 merchants, some of them members of the 
government, such as Colonel Cranston and Samuel Wickham.85 In 1744, it was requested 
that more batteries of cannon be added to the defenses of Newport harbor because the 
security and prosperity of the whole colony were at stake.86 In June of 1745, over forty 
merchants signed a petition emphasizing that Newport still lacked proper fortifications 
and cannons. It was suggested that the thickness of Fort George’s walls be expanded by 
an additional four feet because it was reckoned that the fort would be unable to withstand 
two or three broadsides from a ship of 40 or 50 guns. It was also urged that the fort’s 
gunners be sufficiently trained in the “art of gunnery” or else they would be rather useless 
against any enemy.87 These efforts usually paid off as the General Assembly voted time 
and time again add to the defenses of the port city: new watch houses were built, 
additions and repairs were made to Fort George, and approval was given for more 
ordinance and guns.  
However these measures were not without resistance. When the Assembly 
approved £2,120 worth of additions to Fort George, four deputies were opposed enough 
to enter into the record their dissent: Stephen Hopkins, Job Randall, Walter Phetteplace, 
and George Brown. These deputies argued that Newport already had a significant 
fortification against attack by a privateer; the new additions and repairs would do little or 
nothing to impede an attack by “the fleets of any sovereign prince.” Furthermore it was 
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pointed out that the expense was an unreasonable burden upon the treasury and the 
money would better serve the defense of the colony by remaining unspent.88 It should be 
pointed out that Hopkins, Randall, Phetteplace, and Brown were not from Newport but 
represented areas relatively far from the maritime frontier: Providence, Scituate, and 
Glocester. Their protest shows that politicians from outside of Newport were beginning 
to resent the free spending toward safeguarding that city and harbor. Their complaint 
carries special weight because one of the dissenters, Stephen Hopkins, was a respected 
military officer that had been instrumental in recruiting for the expedition against the 
Spanish West Indies earlier in the decade and had been a member of a number of war-
related committees. It also brings to light the existence of a degree of regionalism in such 
a small colony, between Newport and the southern coast, which was heavily bound to the 
interests of its port and the littoral, and Providence and the hinterland, which were more 
interested in agriculture and other largely land-based pursuits. This intra-colonial 
regionalism further complicates the notion of a coherent American or New England 
colonial identity and corresponding set of interests. 
 
The Problem of Imperial and Provincial Expeditions 
 
The domestic defense of the colony was not the only fiscal and administrative 
task that the government of Rhode Island faced. In opposition to these provincial interests 
were the burdens of several expeditions that placed demands for manpower, ships, and 
money. Three of these four episodes, the expedition to the Spanish West Indies, the 
manning of the Vigilant, and the proposed invasion of New France, were imperial 
enterprises originating in and overseen by Britain.  The expedition to siege, capture, and 
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later garrison Louisbourg, on the other hand, was the brainchild of Massachusetts’ 
governor William Shirley.  How Rhode Island’s politicians dealt with these challenges 
brings to light the methods used to raise troops, the relationship between imperial 
participation and political favor, and ultimately how the colony’s wartime service was a 
focal point of tension between Rhode Island and Massachusetts, specifically in regard to 
the ongoing border dispute.  
The Duke of Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, who served as the Secretary of 
State for the Southern Department89, issued the first call for Rhode Islanders to serve 
abroad in early 1740.  Following the success of the capture of Porto Bello in Spanish 
Panama in November of 1739, a follow up expedition was planned for the capture of 
Cartagena, a heavily fortified port town on the Caribbean coast of South America that 
was a key point for the loading of galleons with gold and silver. In a letter to Governor 
Ward, Newcastle detailed a plan in which colonial forces would be paired with British 
regulars under the command of a British general and a British admiral. Newcastle’s letter 
is loaded with language that urges the colony to appeal to the monetary self-interest of 
possible recruits: a “share of any booty” was to be promised to recruits and “proper 
encouragement” in the form of compensation, arms, and clothing is mentioned as the best 
way to facilitate enlistment. It is only at the very end of his communiqué that the 
“violence and depredations of the Spaniards” is mentioned as an additional “motive.” 
Rhode Island was to procure additional supplies and transport, as well as commission 
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officers to oversee its companies. Newcastle and King George II assured the colonies that 
such expenses would eventually be repaid by the metropole.90  
The governor and General Assembly responded enthusiastically to the call by 
authorizing enlistment bounties and professing their loyalty to the Empire. In May of 
1740, the General Assembly, expounding upon the suggested appeals to self-interest, 
passed an act providing an additional £3 bounty for recruits in addition to the clothes and 
arms promised by the Crown. Furthermore, recruits were exempted for three years from 
any and all military service upon their return. The Assembly ordered that the officers of 
the colony’s militias call together their companies in order to assist in the enlistment of 
troops for Cartagena.91 Letters from Governor Ward to Newcastle and Colonel 
Blackeney, a British officer dispatched to the North American mainland colonies to 
coordinate the expedition, extolled his own colony’s efforts, specifically in comparison to 
Massachusetts. Ward wrote to Blackeney that even though Rhode Island had raised more 
than its proportional fair share of soldiers (compared to its “neighbors”), he wished to be 
informed of “what further may be done on our parts, whereby we may distinguish our 
selves to his Majesty on this occasion and merit your approbation which this colony will 
be very proud of.”92 This sentiment was repeated in a dispatch he wrote to Newcastle on 
June 24, 1741, recounting the colony’s efforts so far: 
“His Majesty's orders for levying a number of men on an expedition against the 
Spaniards came safe to hand the latter end of April and was laid before the 
Assembly the first Wednesday of May [1740] who readily and cheerfully 
complied there with and showed their zeal for his Majesty’s service in their giving 
a bounty to each person enlisting some considerable time before any of the other 
governments, which forwarded us so much more than our neighbors that we soon 
filled up two companies of one hundred men each pursuant to his Majesty’s 
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direction before the [sic] Massachusetts though they are ten times as numerous as 
we…”93 
 
Such professions of provincial loyalty, conveyed in terms of opposition to their political 
rival, Massachusetts, would continue and intensify as the dual conflicts dragged on. 
 The next opportunity for the colony to prove its devotion to the imperial war 
effort came in the spring of 1745. During the colonial campaign to capture Louisbourg, a 
64-gun ship, the Vigilant, which was carrying men and supplies from France with the 
intention of reinforcing the besieged settlement, was captured and put into the service of 
the Royal Navy. In order to crew the vessel, Governor Shirley requested the service of 
sailors from Rhode Island in addition to those he was attempting to recruit or impress 
from his own colony and Connecticut.94 While the Rhode Island government usually did 
not respond favorably or eagerly to the sometimes cajoling and other times bullying 
demands of Shirley, it recognized that this particular request was ultimately in regard to a 
ship of his Majesty’s service.  
On June 18, the General Assembly developed a two-pronged approach to 
providing soldiers and sailors that utilized both coercion and a good deal of monetary 
compensation. For those that voluntarily enlisted for service aboard the Vigilant, a £17 
bounty was offered as well an exemption from any civil arrests. This sum far outweighed 
the mere £3 offered for the same service by Massachusetts.95 If this enticement failed to 
lure the two hundred men the colony thought appropriate, impressment would provide the 
rest. A warrant was issued for the immediate impressment of forty men. From June 19 
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until June 26, ferries, “boatmen,” and all others were strictly prohibited from transporting 
any sailors off of the islands Aquidneck (where Newport is located) and Conanicut, the 
two principal islands of Narragansett Bay. A £20 fine for those found guilty of its 
violation backed this prohibition on the movement of seamen.  This roundup of sailors 
was aided by the closure of Newport harbor to all outgoing shipping until June 26, an 
embargo to be enforced by the guns of Fort George. Only vessels possessing a special 
license from the governor were free to leave. Those impressed were to be kept either at 
the fort or within the Newport jail. These draconian measures were somewhat softened by 
the fact that if an impressed sailor decided to voluntarily enlist, they would be rewarded 
the full £17 bounty as if they had willingly signed up in the first place.96  Despite this 
unprecedented impressment effort in Narragansett Bay, only about seventy sailors were 
obtained for service due to the “scarcity of men.”97 This eagerness, on the part of the 
government, should be seen in the same vein as that exhibited during the Cartagena 
expedition. With the several provincial political interests on the line, chief among them 
the border dispute, Rhode Island sought to reaffirm its commitment to the imperial cause, 
even resorting to impressment, a tactic previously considered but not employed between 
1739 and the spring of 1745. 
In order to fully understand the colony’s reluctance to use impressment, one must 
take into account an Atlantic context of maritime trades and upheaval. Unlike Boston, 
Newport was a harbor heavily involved in privateering. During the dual conflicts, its 
privateering fleet conducted over one quarter of all yearly privateering cruises and berths, 
second only to New York in terms of berths and the most prolific in terms of voyages per 
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year.98 In order to sustain the over one hundred privateering cruises that originated from 
Newport each year, a large and reliable pool of voluntary sailors needed to be ensured. 
Men serving aboard privateers were lured by the possibility of generous financial 
rewards. In contrast, service in the British Royal Navy occurred under significantly worse 
conditions. Wages were low, discipline was harsh, the food was usually poor, disease was 
common, and overcrowding below decks was a serious problem.99 Any widespread use of 
impressment could not only endanger the voluntary labor that privateer ships relied upon 
but could also result in violent revolt. Both New York and Boston, sites of heavy Royal 
Navy impressment, experienced riots during the dual conflicts. In March of 1741, 
tensions in the port city of New York boiled over into arson and violence, pressures that 
were due in part to war-related food shortages and impressment. Similarly, Boston 
experienced upheaval in 1747 when the impressed crew of the HMS Lark fought back 
against pressgangs, joining forces with over a thousand others to fight back against 
coerced royal service.100 In contrast, Rhode Island and Newport served as a sort of haven 
for those seeking to avoid forced service on land as well as sea. Its relatively liberal 
impressment policies and the absence of the Royal Navy combined with the enticements 
of privateering to attract sailors and deserting draftees from Boston and inland 
Massachusetts, yet another point of contention between the two rivals.101 
The resort to coercion for the Vigilant stands in stark contrast to the efforts to 
raise three companies of soldiers for the Louisbourg siege; the attitude toward Shirley’s 
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proposed expedition was markedly less enthusiastic. In a letter to Rhode Island’s 
Governor Greene on January 29, 1745, Shirley appealed to the “common cause” of New 
England while at the same time recognizing the smaller colony’s maritime vulnerability. 
He enclosed a memorandum that outlined the plan of attack and urged Rhode Island to 
supply men and artillery in order to assist in the upcoming siege of the French Canadian 
stronghold on Cape Breton Island.102 Greene responded by calling a special session of the 
General Assembly in February. During this session and a subsequent session held the 
following month, the Assembly outfitted the Tartar to sail with the expedition, created a 
new tax to fund the Louisbourg operation, and called for the formation of a force 
consisting of up to 350 men. These soldiers were encouraged with a £6 bounty (in 
addition to the Massachusetts bounty), rights to any plunder, a free blanket, and 
exemptions for any non-criminal property seizures.103 Despite these enticements, the 
recruitment effort was languishing two months later. The bar was set lower as the 
Assembly now only called for three companies of fifty men each. In fact, Rhode Island 
had quite literally missed the boat; the siege had started in March and reached full pitch 
by late April, with only the Tartar in attendance as the colony’s representative force.104 
Impressment was now put on the table as a viable option but was never used specifically 
for filling out the companies for expedition.105 The contingent of troops finally arrived at 
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Louisburg in the middle of July, a month after the French forces had surrendered on June 
16.106 While the slowness and confusion surrounding Rhode Island’s contribution to the 
expedition may indeed have been due, in part to a scarcity in manpower, the sluggishness 
was also probably related to the skepticism with which the government viewed Shirley’s 
undertaking. This doubt over the Louisbourg endeavor was laid out in great detail in a 
letter from Governor Wanton to Richard Partridge, the colony’s agent in London. These 
concerns will be explored later in this chapter in relation to the search for vindication. 
 Rhode Island would face its final expeditionary challenge a year later in the 
spring of 1746. The Duke of Newcastle informed then Governor Greene about a British 
led scheme to dispatch a large number of regular troops from Europe under the command 
of Scottish Lieutenant General James St. Clair. A contingent of colonial troops was to be 
raised in the New England colonies; Newcastle insisted that Greene “use the utmost 
expedition in the raising of as many men as possible” to rendezvous with St. Clair at 
Louisbourg. Once at Louisbourg, the combined force would sail up the St. Lawrence 
River and siege Quebec. This plan was nothing novel, resembling a failed bid for the 
capital of New France that occurred during Queen Anne’s War some thirty plus years 
before. Once enlisted, soldiers were to be under “his Majesty’s pay,” while Rhode Island 
would cover the expenses of sea transport and supplies, which far outweighed the salaries 
of enlisted men and officers.107 The General Assembly responded with all the alacrity it 
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had displayed when receiving the metropolitan call for manning the Vigilant. Legislation 
passed on June 2 called for the raising of three companies consisting of 100 men each.  
The colonels of the county militia regiments were ordered to direct their officers to enlist 
men from their companies as “expeditiously” as possible. To aid in this process, an 
immense bounty of £50 was offered to recruits as well as the massive sum of £200 for 
anyone with sufficient knowledge of the St. Lawrence River that was willing to serve as a 
pilot for the invasion fleet. It was noted that these actions were undertaken by the 
government to “give all possible evidence of their loyalty and gratitude to His Majesty, 
and zeal for his service.”108 Ten days later, on June 12, the Assembly convened once 
more. Apparently the enticement of bounties had failed to raise the desired 300 men 
quickly enough so a sweeping set of impressments was authorized for the first time since 
the crewing of the Vigilant. As in 1745, the movement of recruits, this time soldiers 
instead of sailors, was limited by restricting movement off of Aquidneck Island. Recruits 
were to be impressed equally from Providence and Newport counties, with King’s 
County being exempted. This exemption was possibly due to that county’s much lower 
population and lack of an urban center. The Sheriff of Newport was authorized to impress 
a number of workmen and sailors in order to outfit and crew the three transport ships 
intended for Louisbourg. This led to the first and only instance of coerced labor directly 
related to Rhode Island’s war effort. Adding to the seriousness of the government 
response was the fact that permission had been granted to impress ships for the 
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expedition109; previously transport ships had been leased or hired by the Assembly from 
Newport merchants.  
 Despite these enthusiastic efforts, the government of Rhode Island continued to be 
pressured for its apparent lack of exertion. On July 4, Governor Shirley and Admiral 
Warren wrote to Governor Greene, in tones more consistent with Shirley than the 
Admiral, chastising him for the “small proportion of forces the colony under [his] 
government has contributed towards carrying on this expedition...” The efforts of New 
Hampshire, a colony also small in population and stature, were deemed to be far superior 
to those of Rhode Island, although the former’s contribution is only alluded to in the 
vaguest of terms. Furthermore, the “extraordinary bounty” sanctioned by Rhode Island is 
criticized because it has drawn men away from neighboring colonies and into the Rhode 
Island companies, having “dampened” enlistment efforts in New England despite the 
offering of lower but still “efficient” bounties. From Connecticut alone, ninety men had 
crossed east into Rhode Island in order to take advantage of the more copious financial 
inducement.110 These complaints were somewhat echoed in an earlier dispatch to Greene 
from Admiral Warren that frowned upon the relatively small number of troops being 
raised by Rhode Island, 300 men being “much fewer than…hoped.”111 It would appear 
that no matter what Rhode Island did, in terms of trying to contribute soldiers for the 
expedition, it would never be good enough for the ever-critical Shirley. While on the one 
hand he accused his neighbor to the south of being lackadaisical in its recruitment, on the 
other its bounty offering was far too zealous and apparently successful enough to have 
drawn men from beyond Rhode Island’s borders. In the end, the expedition to take 
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Quebec never moved beyond Louisbourg; the large British force under St. Clair was 
diverted to coastal raiding activities in France while plans to divert the colonial force 
amassing at Louisbourg to counter the French fortress at Crown Point on Lake 
Champlain never came to fruition. As for the Rhode Island contingent, two of the three 
transports ran aground off of Martha’s Vineyard. Ravaged by sickness and desertion, the 
three companies and their escorting sailors limped home in the winter of 1746-47. 
 In addition to the three expeditions abroad and the pressing demands of civil 
defense, the provincial government also had to contend with requests for material aid and 
military participation from neighboring British colonies. One such plea for mutual 
defense was the call for commissioners from the northeastern colonies to meet in Albany 
in the spring of 1744 to discuss frontier defenses against New France and a military 
alliance with the Iroquois nations of New York. Despite the urgings of New York 
Governor George Clinton, Colonel Josiah Willard, and Governor Shirley, Rhode Island 
declined to actively partake in the proceedings, preferring instead to receive any relevant 
developments from their contacts in Connecticut.112 Likewise, Governor Shirley urged 
Rhode Island to contribute “proper supplies” to the Iroquois in May of 1747 so that they 
could be encouraged to make war upon the French and their Indian allies. Once again the 
leadership of the colony declined to partake in a regional scheme, citing the financial 
burden it would entail.113 Rhode Island, with its directly elected governor and General 
Assembly placed its own local self-interests above the imperial and North American 
priorities of royally appointed governors and their appointees in colonies such as New 
York and Massachusetts.  
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When the colony did cooperate, it was usually with Connecticut, a neighbor that it 
enjoyed relatively good relations with. In a letter written to Connecticut Governor 
Jonathan Law at the urging of the General Assembly, Governor Greene assured his 
neighbor to the west that Rhode Island would “be always ready to lend your government 
what assistance is in our power upon any invasion or attack…for though the governments 
are distinct, yet our common interests are inseparable.”114 This sort of rhetoric, as well as 
the combined operations that occurred, contrast greatly with the government’s attitude 
towards rival Massachusetts and distant New York. Furthermore, cooperative ventures, 
such as the Tartar’s scouting for D’Anville’s fleet or the joint coastal patrols that sloop 
conducted with the Defense, were pertinent to threats that directly affected the security 
Rhode Island. 
 
Vindicating the War Record  
The antagonism between Rhode Island and Massachusetts throughout the war 
years in the context of the border dispute caused the leadership of Rhode Island to be 
hypersensitive on the subject of its contribution to the war. The governors and General 
Assembly were well aware of the defamations that Governor Shirley and his colleagues 
were putting forth both at home and in London. Richard Partridge, Rhode Island’s paid 
representative and lobbyist to the metropole government, voiced such suspicions when 
writing to a British government minister in regards to the 1745 Louisbourg expedition: “I 
am ready to think that Commodore Warren…must have been imposed upon and 
prejudiced by the Massachusetts people respecting the colony of Rhode Island or else he 
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would hardly have wrote home as I understand he did.”115 Governor Wanton was 
similarly convinced of the conspiracy against his colony, writing to Partridge, “the agent 
for the province of the Massachusetts Bay has been very liberal in his aspersions against 
this colony and as we suspect that he will misrepresent our conduct in regard to the Cape 
Breton expedition.”116  
Partridge and the provincial government that employed him took steps in order to 
counter this slander. In the autumn of 1745, the prominent politician, Peter Bours, was 
sent to Louisbourg in order to obtain a “certificate” from Major General Roger Wolcott, 
the Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut and a high ranking officer that had presided over 
the Louisbourg siege, that would vindicate the colony’s part in the undertaking, 
specifically in regard to the dramatic part played by the Tartar in protecting a troop 
convoy of Connecticut soldiers and engaging a French encampment that was en route to 
reinforce the fortress.117 This certificate was later forwarded to Partridge to serve in his 
various lobbying efforts, such as the quest for reimbursement and the border squabble.  
In addition to the testimony of Walcott, Governor Wanton penned a letter to 
Partridge in which he thoroughly explained and defended his colony’s performance over 
the past half decade of conflict. He highlights the eager response during the Spanish West 
Indies expedition contrasting it with Shirley’s Louisbourg endeavor. He argues that 
Shirley’s scheme was unilateral, without the official sanction of the British until after it 
was underway. Furthermore, it was a highly controversial expedition from the outset; the 
vote for approval in the Massachusetts House of Representatives had been razor thin, 
with only one vote separating those in favor from the opposition. He reminds Partridge of 
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the debacle at Cartagena, using it as part of the basis for Rhode Island’s weariness in 
response to the 1745 mission. Furthermore, the northern fisheries off of Nova Scotia were 
characterized as being much more of a provincial concern for New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts than for Rhode Island. Besides this skepticism there was also the practical 
consideration of manpower. He asserts that the colony was exhausted of men due to the 
earlier enlistment for the West Indies and the service of a great deal of men aboard 
privateers. Whereas neighboring Connecticut was able to raise 400 men for the 1746 
expedition without resorting to coercion118, Rhode Island struggled to fill quotas less than 
half that amount. He recounts how the efforts to utilize high monetary bounties fell 
somewhat short of enlistment goals, forcing the government to turn to impressment, 
emphasizing its use as a desperate last resort. He concludes his letter by reiterating the 
record of the Tartar, mentioning his coast’s vulnerability to attack, and stating that Rhode 
Island’s efforts far outweighed those of all the non-New England colonies combined, 
none of them having given “so much and such effectual assistance as this little Colony 
and the merchants of the town of Newport cheerfully afforded.”119 In a different version 
of a similar letter, Wanton goes as far as to declare Massachusetts as being “our avowed 
enemies [emphasis added]…whereby they imagine they may prejudice us, and gain their 
point, concerning the boundaries.”120 Clearly the conflicts of 1739-1748 should be 
understood in a context that transcends vague notions of imperial loyalty and rivalry as 
put forth by Sydney James. The issue at the forefront was clearly the border dispute and 
Massachusetts proved to be as much (if not more) of a territorial threat to the colony as 
either France or Spain. It should be remembered that Shirley had represented 
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Massachusetts in the border dispute before becoming governor of that colony, 
predisposing him to an antagonistic view of Rhode Island even before rising to the office 
of governor. 
 
Conclusions 
 
By the end of hostilities in 1748, Rhode Island’s government could look back at 
the years of the dual conflicts as being bittersweet. The colony’s territorial integrity had 
been preserved and expanded. Neither French nor Spanish had landed at Newport or 
Block Island and Newport’s privateers and the Tartar had swiftly dealt with privateering 
threats on the maritime frontier. The government was informed of the favorable ruling 
regarding its eastern border with Massachusetts during the summer of 1746, the actual 
decision having finally been handed down that April. Governor Greene highlighted the 
military dimension of the controversy, stating that the people in the territory previously in 
question will rejoice because the region had been heavily affected by Massachusetts’ 
impressment efforts. Many were conscientious objectors who had been held against their 
will, being extorted for “great sums of money” in order to buy their own release.121 In 
January of 1747, the General Assembly went to work carefully marking the exact lines of 
the new boundary. Literally no stone was left unturned; the report of the colony’s border 
commissioners that surveyed the line mentions individual oak and pine trees and piles of 
rocks that were setup as demarcation points. Five new towns were incorporated, a new 
county, Bristol, was created, new freemen were admitted, and elections were held to fill 
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the new offices.122 Tellingly, one of these new towns, Warren, was named in honor of the 
British Admiral who had taken part in the Louisbourg expedition. 
Despite these successes, the financial legacies of the wars were that of debt and 
new taxes. Massive amounts of money were printed, borrowed, and taken from the 
treasury to cover war-related expenses. During this nine year period money was spent on 
a variety of projects and needs: the repairs to Fort George, the hiring of transport vessels, 
the issuing of bounties, the billeting of troops, the cruises of the Tartar, the procurement 
of gunpowder, and the pay of sentries. It even got to the point that the colony had to 
borrow £11,000 pounds from a group of Newport merchants in order to pay the officers 
and soldiers of the failed Canada expedition of 1746.123 The Louisbourg and Canada 
expeditions alone required the printing of £180,000 worth of additional currency. The 
practice of printing its self was a point of contention between the colony and metropole, 
in addition to the new taxes that were created to cover such emissions. To make matters 
worse, reimbursements, which were promised by the metropole for certain expenses, 
were either extremely slow in coming or never paid back at all. For instance, the heavy 
scrutiny of the expenses for the failed Canada expedition resulted in only about half of 
those expenses being redeemed. It should come as no surprise that Massachusetts 
Governor Shirley actively sought to prevent disbursements to his New England rival. The 
financial debacle led to a drawn out and tumultuous investigation of how the colonial 
government administered financial affairs, which eventually culminated in the total 
overhaul of the currency.124  
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The price of security on the maritime frontier and the costs of professing imperial 
loyalty were extremely high. The colony of Rhode Island applied not only vast fiscal 
resources to these goals but also the work and service of soldiers, sailors, and politicians, 
bought, coerced, and enticed was all funneled toward a war effort permeated with 
provincial self-interest. This provincial self-interest attempted to rely upon appeals to 
personal self-interest as much as it could, even at the expense of efficiency. Bounties and 
other material incentives, while the backbone of the war effort, sometimes fell short as 
the interests of security, loyalty, region, and commerce competed for the finite resources 
of the smallest of colonies on the British Atlantic seaboard. Manpower shortages were a 
reality made worse by the drain of men created by the port of Newport. The colony’s 
heavy maritime orientation siphoned off potential soldiers as they signed on to 
privateering vessels or sought relatively safe employment in a number of other trades. 
Whether resources were human or material Rhode Island’s dearth stands in stark contrast 
to the supposed “pinnacle of colonial arms” during this period as advocated by military 
historians such as Selesky and Steele. These vast expenditures should be understood as 
strains on the relationship between colony and metropole. While imperial warfare may 
have sparked a heightened sense of imperial allegiance to some individual officers and 
politicians, the costs of war at the provincial level certainly dampened sympathies for the 
imperial cause. 
Despite these shortcomings instances of increased government action, whether in 
the realm of the Quakers, militias, or merchants, expanded the powers of the provincial 
administration, in symbolic and substantial ways. New prerogatives such as the ability to 
name militia officers and controls over outgoing ships heightened the authority of 
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provincial governing institutions. Symbolically, the provincial government and associated 
elites undertook ceremonies of power, rituals that Max Weber sees as self-justifications 
of “the truth of their preeminence” and Clifford Geertz recognizes as “the power of 
grandeur to organize the world.”125 Whether their efforts were highly visible, such as the 
declaration of war ceremonies or border survey walks, or more private, in the form of 
exclusive artillery companies, increases in elite power transcended the purely political. 
These instances not only depict the increased vigor of colonial governing bodies, but they 
can also be seen as an effort by the colony’s elites to reinforce their social hegemony. 
This expansion of powers and privileges occurred in the context of a highly participatory 
society in which soldiers, elites, and freemen exercised a relatively high degree of 
autonomy and choice. Although some of this agency was overridden by legislation, such 
as the cessation of militia elections, the governor and General Assembly balanced 
imperial demands with provincial concerns and limits on coercion. Their efforts can be 
viewed as being successful in that they avoided the riots and upheavals experienced in 
colonies such as Massachusetts and New York during the same period of time. Unlike 
these colonies, Rhode Island was much more restrained in its impressment efforts and 
was free of the heavy-handed imperial presence that existed in ports such as Boston and 
New York. 
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Chapter 3: Recruitment, Monotony, and Debacle: Rhode Island’s Soldiers at Home 
and Abroad 
 
 The small amount of scholarship that has examined the role of Rhode Island 
during the dual conflicts has been overwhelmingly interested in actions occurring on the 
seas, specifically the exploits of privateers.126 This oversight is indeed understandable 
given the colony’s heavy nautical orientation and the relative lack of actual fighting seen 
by its troops. In fact, soldiers from Rhode Island only actually partook in one campaign, 
the siege of Cartagena, due to having missed the siege of Louisbourg and the cancellation 
of the expedition to “reduce Canada” in the latter years of King George’s War. This is not 
to say an examination of these forces is unnecessary or that their experiences were in any 
way comfortable or privileged. On the contrary, an assessment of the makeup, actions, 
conditions, and experiences of Rhode Island’s land forces is valuable for several reasons. 
Firstly, by seeing how forces were raised and who led and served in the various 
companies, one can get an idea of how the colony faced issues of manpower shortages 
and attempted to appeal to recruits. It also reveals whom they thought suitable for both 
the expeditions abroad and civil defense at home. Secondly, by understanding the 
recruitment methods of the mid-eighteenth century, the place of the imperial conflicts 
becomes clearer within the context of the impressment of the seventeenth century and the 
large-scale volunteerism that characterized the conflicts of the latter part of the 1700s. 
Lastly, although most of the men Rhode Island raised were to never see combat, their 
experiences illustrate the everyday hardships, disciplinary regimen, and monotony of 
military service in the late early modern period. 
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 Rhode Island raised roughly 600 officers and soldiers for the expeditions of the 
dual imperial conflicts between 1739 and 1748. For all three instances, units were 
organized geographically. The two infantry companies raised for the West Indies in 1740 
were the “Island” company, recruited from Newport and Narragansett Bay and a 
“Mainland” company, levied from the remainder of the colony. The three companies of 
the Louisbourg expedition in 1745 appear to have followed similar lines, each company 
seeming to correspond with the colony’s three different counties: Providence, Newport, 
and Kings. The three companies for the proposed Canada campaign of 1746 were 
composed of one company from Newport county, the second from Providence county, 
and the third a mixture of the two, Kings county having been excused by the Assembly. 
The officers of these various companies were from the regions units originated from. 
Officers were generally appointed by the Assembly and approved and commissioned by 
the Governor and his Council. Commissions were usually dispatched from the imperial 
government in Britain but were sometimes provincial in nature until approved by British 
field officers upon arrival. 
 
Expeditionary Officers 
 
 The types of men selected by the government to serve as company captains in the 
West Indies and Canada depict the seriousness with which the provincial government 
handled imperial participation.  Those selected to serve as junior officers, lieutenants and 
ensigns, were also usually men of some status, freemen at the very least. In addition, 
service in these expeditions served as experience that was built upon as these officers 
went on to political and military positions in the years following the conflict. From the 
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very beginning, the government selected men of high stature or popularity to lead 
expeditionary companies, a practice certainly not unique to the Ocean Colony. The head 
of the Island Company in 1740 was Captain Samuel Dunn. Dunn was admitted as a 
freeman to the colony as a resident of Newport in 1720, had married Ann Clarke of 
Kingston, Rhode Island in 1718, and was a member of the Second Baptist Church in that 
town.127 He had been elected to the position of the lieutenant of the Newport’s second 
company of militia in 1733 and 1734 and would later go on to be annually elected captain 
of that unit from 1735 until accepting leadership of the Island Company in 1740, a sign of 
his popularity among the militiamen of his town. Another sign of his popularity was that 
he was also chosen to serve as the principal recruiting officer for his expeditionary 
company. 128  
The second captain, heading up the Mainland Company, was even more 
distinguished, Captain William Hopkins. Unlike, Dunn, Hopkins came from an 
established and powerful family. The Hopkins of Providence produced several politicians 
and officers in the colonial period of Rhode Island. His father had been a military officer, 
deputy in the legislature, and surveyor for the town of Providence.129 His younger 
brother, Stephen, would go on to serve as a governor of the colony on several occasions 
in the 1750s and 60s and become a representative at the Continental Congress. His other 
younger brother, Esek, was a naval officer who would become the first commander of the 
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American navy during the Revolutionary War. William himself was no slouch; in 1721 
he was elected ensign of one of Providence’s militia companies, rising through the ranks, 
winning elections to the ranks of lieutenant in 1733 and captain in 1734. Four years later 
he would become the lieutenant colonel of Providence’s militia regiment, becoming the 
second highest officer in that town’s militia. He was also politically active, serving as a 
legislator from Providence he was on a variety of military committees, and was also a 
justice of the peace. In 1740, Hopkins, thirty-five years old, resigned from his prestigious 
post to serve as a second in command of the Mainland Company, a lesser rank, because 
of his “excitement” for the expedition.130 Like Dunn, he also served as recruitment officer 
for his own unit. When Joseph Sheffield soon resigned his position, Hopkins took 
command of the company. Ever adventurous, and perhaps a touch acquisitive, he would 
later go on to serve as the captain of the privateer Prince Frederick in 1743, after the 
completion of the Caribbean expedition. 
The presence of men from well-connected and powerful families in the 
captaincies of expeditionary companies continued during the officer nominations in 1745 
and 1746, for Louisbourg and the Canada expeditions respectively. Captain Joshua 
Champlin came from such a family. The Champlins were based out of the southern part 
of the colony, specifically Westerly in Kings County. Champlins had served as legislators 
and justices of the peace for Westerly since the last decade of the seventeenth century, 
perpetually holding offices into the 1740s and beyond. Joshua himself was selected to be 
a militia captain for one of Westerly’s companies in 1742 and was a relatively newly 
minted freeman of that town, having achieved that status in 1737. He would later go on to 
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serve as an officer in both the French and Indian War (at Lake George) and in the 
American Revolution.131  
Captain Edward Cole, who rose to his rank after the death of Richard Mumford at 
Louisbourg and served as a company captain in both 1745 and 1746, also came from a 
background of power and prestige. Although Cole appears to have no previous militia 
leadership experience before the war and was a tanner by trade, his father, Elisha Cole, 
was a legislator from Kingstown who advanced to the position of Assistant in the 
governor’s council. The Cole family was one of the earliest to settle Narragansett Bay 
and was directly descended from Anne Hutchison. After King George’s War Edward 
became a merchant and went on to serve as a lieutenant colonel in the French and Indian 
War. At the outbreak of the Revolution, he was a firm loyalist and raised soldiers to fight 
the rebellion. He lived out his final days, in exile, having settled in New Brunswick, 
Canada, after the confiscation of all of his property in Rhode Island.132  
Captain William Rice was from a family that occupied important provincial 
positions, serving as militia officers, sheriffs, and judge in Warwick and Providence 
County. He married Phebe Tripp in 1730 and became a freeman of the colony in 1732. A 
man of “some property and a good deal of…influence,” William carried on the family 
tradition of office holding, serving as a justice of the peace for Warwick between 1739 
and 1742, a deputy in the legislature from 1743 until 1746, and on the governor’s council 
in 1744-45. Like Cole, Rice had minimal military experience, serving a brief stint in the 
Providence county Light Horse over ten years prior to his appointment by the General 
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Assembly. His journal kept during the calamitous voyage of 1746 that floundered off of 
Martha’s Vineyard, is an extremely rare and therefore valuable first hand account of 
Rhode Island service during the time.133 
While the abovementioned captains (which includes nearly all that held that rank) 
often came from powerful families and were popular and prestigious before their service, 
lower officers, the lieutenants and ensigns that were the second and third in command of 
the various expeditionary companies, sometimes rose to prominence after their 
experiences. For these men, appointments to lower officer positions served as stepping-
stones to future prominence. Lieutenant Walter Chaloner, who served in the Island 
Company of the West Indies expedition, seems to have come from relatively obscure 
roots and had no previous militia leadership experience. However, after returning from 
the Caribbean, Chaloner would go on to be the captain of Fort George in 1745, a deputy 
representing Newport, a member of several military committees in the General 
Assembly, and an active leader in Newport’s Anglican Trinity Church. Later in life he 
would serve as a sheriff for Newport County. Like Cole, Chaloner sided with the Crown 
during the American Revolution and was exiled to New Brunswick where he died in 
1796.134 Nathan Carpenter, a newly minted freeman of Newport in 1744, was named a 
militia officer for that county and then soon placed in William Rice’s company. After the 
death of Rice in January 1747, Carpenter completed a rise from freeman to military 
captain in a mere three years. Lieutenant Robert Sterry, appointed to be a militia officer 
in Providence by the General Assembly and appointed to one of the companies intended 
for Canada in 1746, would later rise to the rank of captain, leading one of Rhode Island’s 
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infantry companies during the French and Indian War. Ensign Samuel Nichols, also of 
the failed Canada expedition of 1746, rose to the rank of lieutenant during the French and 
Indian War, partaking in the same campaign at Crown Point that Sterry did.  
Some of the officers of Rhode Island made very favorable impressions upon high 
ranking British and colonial leaders in the field. General Pepperell, the colonial 
commander at Louisbourg, promoted Lieutenant Richard Hoyle to the rank of captain, 
giving him command of a Massachusetts company.135 Ensign William Smith, of 
Providence, served with distinction in the West Indies and was promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant by the British Major General Wentworth, noting his “good character.” 
Wentworth also felt highly of Captain Hopkins, recognizing his good service by putting 
him to work as a recruiter of reinforcements in New York and Rhode Island. 136 
Patterns of officer commissions had a curious exception in the form of Edward 
Kinnicutt. Kinnicutt was given charge of the Rhode Island regiment intended for the 1746 
invasion of French Canada. He appears to have had no prior militia or governmental 
leadership experience but instead was a wealthy Providence merchant.137 Despite his 
relative obscurity, he was given the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the second highest to be 
awarded by the General Assembly during the war years. His nomination was almost 
certainly the result of nepotism, perhaps motivated by political favoritism of the current 
legislature or his connection to the powerful Tillinghast family through marriage.  
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Whatever the reason, he is a glaring deviation from the networks from which the 
majority of officers emerged. Company captains and other senior officers were almost 
always among the most prominent of Rhode Island’s provincial elites. Their backgrounds 
were usually a blend of respected family names, experience as a colonial officeholder, 
and militia captaincies. Junior officers, on the other hand, were more likely to be newly 
minted freemen; men of modest means and property, acquired either through inheritance, 
marriage, or burgeoning careers. Oftentimes service during the dual conflicts was a step 
toward prominence in the wars and politics of the second half of the century. Meritocracy 
and preferential patronage existed side by side as these men served together yet competed 
for advancement in perhaps the most mobile of America’s colonial societies. 
 
Expeditionary Soldiers 
 
 While it is relatively easy to discern the backgrounds, means, and careers of the 
colony’s expeditionary officers, the backgrounds and characteristics of the much more 
numerous ordinary soldiers are far more difficult to determine.  Despite the obscurity of 
those who enlisted, examining muster rolls and cross-referencing them with the records 
of the colony can glean clues about the makeup of the bulk of the companies. Further 
information can be surmised by “reading between the lines” of documents such as Rice’s 
journal, provincial legislation, and high-level correspondence. What emerges is a group 
of men that is overwhelmingly transient, at least somewhat ethnically diverse, and more 
often than not on the margins of society. 
 The transitory nature of the large majority of Rhode Island’s contingents sent 
abroad is revealed by the fact that most were not (and would never become) freemen of 
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the colony. Of 63 soldiers mentioned by name for the expedition to the Spanish West 
Indies, only about six could possibly have been freemen.138 The later expeditions to 
Canada reveal a similar deficiency in freemen. A careful examination of the company 
recruited in and around Providence for Louisbourg yields only 3 potential freemen out of 
37 non-officers. Likewise, there are only 20 potential freemen out of 97 men in the 
Providence company for the 1746 expedition. One would suspect even lower percentages 
for the companies originating from Newport, given that it is a highly mobile port town. 
The non-local character of many of these soldiers is also revealed by the need to billet 
large numbers of men at the homes of expeditionary and militia officers and private 
citizens. For the Cartagena expedition alone, soldiers were billeted at the homes of 
Captain Hopkins, Ensign Smith, and others, in Providence, Kings County, and 
Newport.139 It also should be mentioned that a number of recruits did not originate from 
Rhode Island or its seafaring population at all but instead came from neighboring 
colonies in order to seek the colony’s more ample bounties, instances of which raised the 
ire of Massachusetts Governor Shirley.140 This unsettled character is also illustrated by 
the presence of a large number of bachelors. Two of the three company lists of men 
stationed at Louisbourg mention whether or not someone had family, meaning a wife and 
or children. Over two-thirds of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers (sergeants and 
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corporals) in both the Providence and Kings County companies were bachelors.141 Again, 
one would suspect that the Newport company would have an even higher proportion. 
 A number of the soldiers that served in Rhode Island’s expeditionary companies 
were non-whites. Howard Chapin’s list of Rhode Island soldiers serving during the dual 
conflicts, which is by no means complete, lists nine men confirmed to be Indians that 
took part in the imperial campaigns. An additional six men of the 1746 expedition had 
surnames, such as Tyken and Mew, that were only associated with Indians in Rhode 
Island’s 1774 census.142 Furthermore, the journal of William Rice kept during the same 
expedition names two different Indians that deserted when the convoy was stopped at 
Martha’s Vineyard, one of them, Michael Smiry, was a Nantucket Indian that Rice had 
enlisted the night before.143 One can also infer with some certainty that several others 
were also of Indian heritage by the presence of surnames such as Wamogg and Tonquot 
that appear on occasion throughout the various muster rolls. At the absolute least, 20 out 
of the total 600 or so men raised by Rhode Island were Indians. In reality this proportion 
is probably much higher if one were able to discern the ethnicity of those who took 
Anglicized names, a common practice among the Indian population of southern New 
England during this time. By 1748, Rhode Island had roughly 1,000 Indians settled 
within its borders144, most living either on Indian lands or working as servants for whites. 
Soldiers were probably drawn not only from the colony’s local Narragansett Indian 
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population but also from Indian populations elsewhere in neighboring colonies (such as 
Michael Smiry from Nantucket) and the seafaring population of Newport that contained a 
number of Native American sailors.  
The recruitment of Indian soldiers in the armies of New England during the dual 
conflicts marked a new phase of Native American participation in the colonial wars of the 
region. Whereas earlier conflicts involved entire bands of Indians aiding efforts against 
both the French and indigenous enemies145, their participation in the mid-eighteenth 
century was on an individual basis, a testament to the contractual nature of enlistment and 
the declining cohesion of Indian groups in southern New England. Expeditionary armies 
were just one of the groups competing for contractual Indian manpower in an Atlantic 
labor market. Losses incurred by the nearly constant colonial wars heightened the 
demand for farmhands, sailors, and soldiers. Indians sought work aboard whaling vessels 
and on southern New England farms, usually trapped in a cycle of debt and indentured 
servitude as they attempted to fully pay off debts to English merchants for goods such as 
foodstuffs, clothing, and tools.146 
 This non-white element was augmented by the presence of blacks in the 
expeditionary companies. Their presence, which is even more difficult to detect, can be 
gleaned from examining surnames in the muster rolls and identifying those that appear 
exclusively with black families in the 1774 census. Unlike Indians, Chapin does not 
identify any soldiers in his list as being black or of African descent. At least three men of 
the 1746 expedition and one of the 1740 West Indies campaign were black, having the 
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surnames of Sambo and Caesar. The names of blacks were very likely to be Anglicized, 
even more than those of Indians, since many adopted the surnames of previous masters or 
were assigned names during servitude. To complicate efforts at identification further is 
the fact that the colony’s black and Indian population sometimes interbred, producing 
“mustee” offspring.147 It is estimated that Rhode Island had a little under 3,000 blacks, 
slave and free, in 1748, over a third of which were concentrated in Newport.148 For the 
free black population of the colony, military service could prove to be a potentially 
lucrative occupation, given the wages and bounties that all recruits received. Such 
employment should be considered particularly valuable to a population that was often 
limited in terms of available trades and opportunities. 
 The peripheral nature of the typical Rhode Island recruit becomes clearer upon 
examining the types of recruitment methods used to lure and coerce potential soldiers to 
serve abroad. The impressment used to fill the companies headed to Louisbourg was 
limited in such a way that only marginal men could be coerced into service. Only 
“transient sea-faring men, and persons who have no certain place of abode, or such as 
have no visible honest means of getting their living” could be forced into service. A man 
not fitting these criteria who happened to find himself pressed into one of Rhode Island’s 
expeditionary companies could be discharged once he obtained a certificate from a 
government official that confirmed his means.149 Targeted recruitment aimed at those 
with little means was also evident in a letter written to Governor Wanton from a colonial 
general. When discussing advances on pay, he notes that “several debtors might be able 
to clear off or compound with their creditors and many servants might obtain their 
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masters’ leave to enlist.”150 Incentives also targeted the poor and needy, offering to fill 
basic material needs.  Those who enlisted to serve in the West Indies in 1741 were 
provided with a coat, which one would suspect to be a necessity given the New England 
winter, while recruits for the aborted Canada expedition of 1746 were provided with a 
clothing allowance. Also, legislation concerning recruitment for expeditionary service 
often held a stipulation allowing the exemption of recruits from property seizures and 
civil arrest.151 While such incentives may seem rather under whelming, it is important to 
keep in mind that life for many during the Early Modern period was, in the words of 
Hobbes, “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Seemingly basic items, such as coats, clothing, 
blankets, and tents, were not only coveted but also prized.  
Attempts by colonial governments to pull transients and those of little means into 
the ranks of provincial forces mirrored the efforts of European governments in the Early 
Modern period.152 Directing men toward such service strengthened government oversight 
as control over seemingly unsettled individuals was sought. This is not say that the vast 
majority of the colony’s troops were impoverished. However, the presence of so many 
single, non-freemen, impressed, and non-white soldiers is a far cry from the myth of the 
preponderance of “citizen soldiers” that once prevailed in the history of colonial 
American warfare. 
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The Expeditionary Experience: Disease, Disorder, and Disaster 
 
 The expeditionary experience of Rhode Island’s various companies of soldiers 
was characterized by a good deal of disease, disorder, and disaster. Before troops even 
embarked aboard transports they were the subjects of supervision in order to curtail 
desertions. Desertion was a very real problem from the very beginning of the dual 
conflicts; a good deal of the troops who voluntarily enlisted for the West Indies 
expedition deserted before leaving the colony. The capture of these men, who presumably 
collected their bounties and absconded, was encouraged by the enacting of a £10 reward 
for each deserter brought before the authorities. This manhunt was later tempered by 
granting amnesty to deserters that turned themselves and their material “damages” over to 
the colony.153 Given this context of desertion, a shift occurred in the way that soldiers 
waiting to embark their transport ships were housed. Whereas recruits were billeted in 
private residences before leaving for the West Indies or Louisbourg, troops destined for 
service in the Canada expedition of 1746 were at first limited to Aquidneck Island and 
then eventually strictly confined to their transports and Goat Island (“for exercising”), the 
location of Fort George in Newport Harbor. Preparations for the 1746 campaign were 
also the first time that the General Assembly established a council of war for the sole 
purpose of disciplining officers and soldiers until they joined with the main force at their 
destination.154 Service in the Rhode Island expeditionary companies was not all hardship 
and discipline. For instance, the officers leading the Rhode Island contingent to the 
Caribbean were invited by the Assembly Speaker and Deputy Governor to “dine with the 
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court” before their embarkation while the lower officers and soldiers were given £15 
worth of liquor with which to celebrate.155 
 Concerns about desertion and discipline did not recede as transport ships left the 
shores of Rhode Island and entered the Atlantic and other ports of call. General Pepperell, 
commander of the Louisbourg siege, mentions some Rhode Island soldiers who had 
deserted in Boston while en route to Cape Breton Island in a letter to Governor 
Wanton.156 The journal kept by Captain Rice during the tribulations of the failed Canada 
expedition provides a remarkable insight into the daily struggle that was waged for order. 
On November 6, two days after leaving Newport, one of the transport ships, the Africa, 
ran aground close to the island of Martha’s Vineyard. The men aboard the Africa, 
“drenched” and “miserable,” soon became “very mutinous” until they were “reduced to 
submission” by their officers. On November 8, three soldiers deserted. This breakdown in 
order continued two days later when two unnamed officers of the contingent were found 
to be cavorting (or attempting to cavort with) two local women. These “fair damsels” 
“jilted” the two officers and then turned them in to the superior officers for a “very small 
reward.” The convoy finally left Martha’s Vineyard only to be grounded on the shallows 
off of the island of Nantucket on November 12. Two days later, Rice returned from 
supper and socializing aboard the Tartar and transport ship Neptune to discover that his 
men were “very disorderly and generally drunk.” One of his junior officers, again 
unnamed, had sold a barrel of the ship’s cider to the soldiers for a personal profit, an act 
that would be repeated some four days later. A second instance of one of Rice’s officers 
hawking goods to soldiers occurred on November 17 when it was found that the officer 
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had been selling apples to the men for “exorbitant” prices. Rice also frowned on card 
playing; on two separate occasions decks of cards were confiscated from his soldiers and 
thrown overboard.157  
The disorder portrayed in the journal culminates on December 7 when it was 
announced that the floundering expedition, which was still on Nantucket, would still be 
proceeding on to Nova Scotia instead of returning to Newport as had been hoped. A 
“great number of…soldiers deserted,” twelve of which were from Rice’s own company, 
although four were later “recovered by persons employed to apprehend them.” The last 
entry in the journal, dated Christmas day of 1746, weeks before Rice would succumb to 
sickness and die, reaffirms his disdain for the conduct of his men: “great troubles arise in 
adjusting our accounts from an excessive disposition in the people to extortion, knavery, 
and chicanery.”158 The breakdown in discipline witnessed by Rice was not restricted to 
the rabble of the regular soldier but included the greed and “knavery” of his own officers. 
Sickness and disease were another, more severe, malefactor that characterized the 
expedition experience. All three of the expeditions that Rhode Island partook in were 
ravaged by poor health conditions. The failed attacks on Cartagena and later Santiago, 
Cuba, experienced not only battle-related deaths but also casualties caused by tropical 
illness. As a result the death rate was often extremely high. Less than 20 soldiers of 
Rhode Island’s contingent of 200 returned home and of the 500 Massachusetts soldiers 
that fought in the West Indies, only 50 returned.159 Major General Thomas Wentworth, 
the commander of the British and colonial land forces involved in the expedition, wrote 
to Governor Ward that some of the Rhode Islanders returning home at the close of the 
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expedition in the autumn of 1742 would be “feeble and sick.”160 An examination of the 
lists of Rhode Island soldiers compiled at Louisbourg during the fall of 1745 provides a 
snapshot of the poor condition the men were in. Two of the company lists noted whether 
or not certain soldiers were “sick” or not. In the Newport company, nine out of 40 men 
were listed as being currently ill with an additional thirteen of the 40 already having died 
of sickness. Captain Champlin’s Kings County company was in similar poor order. This 
company had been reduced from its original compliment of 50 men to 27 by the fall of 
1745. Of the remaining 27, 10 were listed as being currently sick.161 The contingent from 
Rhode Island was not alone in this suffering; an examination of several journals kept by 
soldiers and officers at Louisbourg reveals the daily presence of sickness, death, dying in 
the months that followed the completion of the siege as the provincial forces awaited 
British reinforcements from Europe.162  
The failed expedition to invade French Canada faced similar hardships, even 
before it left Newport. Captain Rice records that “the bloody flux” (dysentery) broke out 
during the summer of 1746 while the companies were still assembling. Dysentery, which 
Rice attributes to “the heat of the season and great rain,” was followed by a “putrid fever” 
that broke out that October while the soldiers were still waiting to leave the harbor. He 
later caught ill, like many of the other troops, that November while being stuck at 
Nantucket, noting on November 20 that “the measles broke out upon me and I became 
very sick.” By early December, the measles and fever were “universal” among at least 
two of the three companies and entries of casualties began to mark the passing of each 
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day.163 Knowledge of high casualty rates, whether from enemy arms or illness, surely 
circulated among potential recruits, serving as a major deterrent to the colony’s 
recruitment efforts. 
 
Civil Defense Forces on the Maritime Frontier 
 
The trials and tribulations that characterized service in any one of Rhode Island’s 
expeditionary forces were largely absent from the experiences of those that took up arms 
at home in the civil defense of the colony between the years of 1739 and 1748. Other than 
the outbreak of dysentery that occurred at Fort George during the summer of 1746, those 
serving at the fort, partaking in garrison duty on Block Island, or participating in the 
nightly watch of Newport and other coastal communities appear to have escaped 
unscathed from either illness or the enemy. Documentation regarding the experience and 
makeup of ordinary soldiers serving in Rhode Island is quite sparse.164 However those 
that were appointed to be officers were usually quite prominent, much like their 
counterparts in the expeditionary companies. Even if the appointments were somewhat 
nepotistic, the high profile nature of officers at home suggests that the defensive effort 
was considered to be just as serious by the colonial government, highlighting the very 
real threat felt the colony’s elites. 
 
Fort George 
 
 The most notable and experienced of Rhode Island’s officers was John Cranston, 
who served as the captain of Fort George from the outbreak of hostilities in 1739 until 
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1745. Cranston was a direct descendent of one of the colony’s founding families and had 
served as the leader of Rhode Island’s contingent of troops at the siege of Port Royal in 
Nova Scotia during the previous imperial war, Queen Anne’s War, some thirty years 
earlier.  By 1739 he held the rank of colonel in the colonial militia, the highest rank 
awarded to any officer in the colony until the outbreak of the American Revolution. In 
1744, the General Assembly added a lieutenancy to the fort’s garrison. The three men 
who served as the junior officer at this post were of little political or military significance 
at the outbreak of the war. However, one of them, Samuel Freebody, who severed two 
different stints at Goat Island (his first experience with military leadership), would go on 
to become a high ranking officer in the Newport county militia during the French and 
Indian War. Freebody was a socially active merchant who came from an established 
family; he even hosted a dance at his former post in December of 1752.165 
 Service at Fort George was a far cry from the moonlit soiree held at the fort that 
winter night five years after the war had ended. After the firing of the fort’s guns on the 
day that war was officially proclaimed, life at the fort appears to have been unusually 
mundane with a few notable exceptions. The fort was instrumental in the impressment 
efforts of June 1745 when Newport harbor was sealed off and the garrison was tasked 
with preventing all vessels, whether a canoe or sloop, from leaving.166 The daily routine 
was also disrupted by the lodging of troops preparing to embark for Canada in 1745 and 
1746, adding over one hundred men and the presence of their transports for weeks or 
more to an island that was usually inhabited by less than thirty soldiers and officers. 
Although martial activity was generally subdued, there was no lack of building and repair 
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work taking place in and around the fort. On more than one occasion the General 
Assembly ordered that the fort be expanded and repaired, making the structure on Goat 
Island often in a state of renovation. The fort had been neglected in the years since Queen 
Anne’s War. In 1740, the Assembly ordered that the fort’s platform be widened, the 
powder room be given a ceiling, the storehouse floored, and that the barracks house be 
repaired. In 1741, repairs were carried out of the fort’s lower battery. Additional guns 
were added in June of 1744, another round of repairs was ordered in February of 1746, 
and seven months later approval for a controversial new battery of cannons was 
granted.167 
 Of the ten men known to have served as ordinary soldiers at Fort George in 1743, 
little can be inferred. Only one of them, Charles Dyer, was a freeman, having achieved 
his status in 1734 in Newport. Another, Young Axton, was also a resident of Newport, 
having been married at the Episcopal church of Newport in 1720.168 A possible tendency 
for recruits for the garrison to originate from Newport is given some additional credence 
by the fact that a majority of the ten surnames are listed under that town in the 1774 
census. Each compliment of soldiers stationed at the fort contained a gunner. The gunner 
was tasked with aiming the artillery and was paid significantly more than the regular 
sentries for the skilled nature of his assignment. During the war years, the fort was 
manned year-round. However, the number of soldiers stationed on Goat Island fluctuated 
throughout the conflict. Initially twelve men were raised by the 1740 defense act. 
Between 1740 and 1744, an additional eight men were added to the fort’s compliment. 
When France entered the war in 1744, the fort peaked at thirty soldiers. This situation 
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would only be temporary as twenty-one troops were dismissed in the fall of that same 
year. The General Assembly raised the fort’s occupation once more in May of 1746, 
returning the compliment to thirty, where it would remain until the end of hostilities in 
1748.169  
 
The Block Island Garrison 
 
Rhode Island’s other standing body of troops was stationed on Block Island, the 
most vulnerable and isolated location in the whole of the colony. Although Block Island 
was home to a small company of militia during peacetime, local residents and political 
leaders deemed their protection insufficient and repeatedly petitioned the provincial 
government for additional soldiers. The first batch of twenty additional troops was 
recruited for a six-month stretch, beginning in April of 1740.170 Another twenty soldiers 
were recruited from throughout the colony in the spring of the following year and 
transported to the island where they were placed under the command of Edward Sands.171 
Sands was a newly minted militia captain that had been appointed by the Assembly after 
the suspension of officer elections. He hailed from one of the oldest and most influential 
families within the small community and also served as deputy in the provincial 
legislature between 1742 and 1746. The twenty-man garrison lasted until the August of 
1744 when the Assembly dismissed the additional soldiers. This hiatus of additional 
protection would last less than a year as the islanders successfully lobbied for the return 
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of the garrison; seven men were recruited from each of the mainland counties and 
transported to the island in the spring of 1745.172  
While the arrival of expeditionary troops or the closing of the harbor at least 
sometimes punctuated the tedium of being stationed at Fort George, service on Block 
Island appears to have been even more uneventful despite the fear of raid or invasion 
present throughout the conflict.173 The desertion of soldiers from the island aboard 
outbound ships appears to have depleted the strength of the various garrisons, perhaps as 
a result of this inaction or spurred by the desire to pursue a potentially more lucrative 
service. This loss of manpower is mentioned in two different petitions, with the islanders 
even going so far as to request that a law be enacted to prohibit the boarding of a ship 
without a “license” from the militia captain.174 Those that stayed on the island were 
lodged in private residences and boarded at the expense of the inhabitants of the island. 
Under their charge were six “great guns” that were remounted on newly constructed gun 
carriages and positioned around the island in order to fire upon an enemy ship. Despite 
the presence of some enemy privateers around the island, it appears as if these guns were 
never fired in anger during the course of the dual conflicts.  
 
Watch & Ward 
 
The third component of the colony’s self defense scheme were the watch and 
wards that were established in Newport, Portsmouth, and Jamestown, three principal 
communities located on the shores of the Narragansett Bay. While the defense of Block 
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Island and Fort George were handled by the General Assembly, the governor, his council, 
and the various local militia officers were instrumental in creating and regulating the 
watch. The watches were first established on April 21, 1740 during the council of war 
session that marked the official commencement of the War of Jenkins’ Ear in the 
colony.175 Watches occurred every night in the three towns. Newport was allotted twelve 
sentinels, stationed at high points and peninsulas around the town. In addition, four “good 
men” were to ward each day. The Portsmouth night watch involved three men while 
guard duty in Jamestown only made use of two guards. These soldiers were given arms 
and ammunition and not only charged with providing the appropriate signals and alarm in 
case of an emergency, but also with preserving the “peace” and cracking down on 
“disorderly” persons. They were under the direct supervision of local militia officers.  
In mid-December of 1741 the governor’s committee tasked with regulating the 
watch and ward in Newport thought it necessary to enact a series of regulations over the 
patrols. Those participating in this duty were only to be “good and substantial” persons. 
Night duty would begin at nine at night and only end at sunrise. Beats were to be walked 
at least twice a night and those disturbing the peace were to be reported to the militia 
officers at the end of a shift. These officers were now reminded to inspect their sentries 
and make sure order was kept and their duty done. For those stepping out of line, a 
wooden horse was created, the riding of which would serve as punishment for the 
negligent.176 Such shirking of duty seems to have persisted into 1743, when a fine was 
added to the punishment for falling asleep on duty or otherwise neglecting one’s post. 
                                                 
175
 For the records regarding the establishment and regulation of the watches, see GCR  I, 146-9, 158-60, 
163-4. 
176
 “Riding the wooden horse” was a popular punishment in the armies of colonial America, dating back to 
the seventeenth century. 
 84 
Sentries were ordered to be on the lookout for buildings that were kept lit after eleven 
o’clock at night; they were to “enquire the reason” and not depart until a “satisfactory” 
answer had been received. Such a stringent curfew must surely not have sat well with the 
denizens of the vibrant port community. The direct interaction between the men on guard 
duty, responsible for maintaining the nighttime “peace,” and Newport’s public evidently 
provoked confrontations; in 1743 sentries were empowered to bring anyone who had 
insulted or assaulted them before a justice of the peace the next morning.  
Newport’s watch and ward persisted until at least 1746. A sampling of the names 
of individuals who served as nightly guards in that year reveals an overwhelming number 
of local elites. Virtually every one of them was a Newport freeman and most either held a 
political office or were prominent merchants. Notables included members of the rich and 
powerful Tillinghast family, several justices of the peace, sheriffs, and a judicial clerk. 
Even the men of lower status held relatively high positions, with a few having also served 
as masters and quartermasters aboard privateering ships.177 The Newport watch and ward, 
at least by 1746, was a way for the town’s elite to participate in the war effort, albeit in a 
part-time capacity. It was such elites, especially the merchants among them, who had 
petitioned their provincial government on more than one occasion to improve the 
defenses of the vulnerable town. More than a few of these prominent citizens of Newport 
transcended the pleas put to paper by actively taking part in the defense of the home of 
their families and livelihoods. Such service went beyond the confines of patrolling for 
French or Spanish interlopers, as these men were also actively involved with policing the 
domestic sphere.  
                                                 
177
 I draw on Chapin’s A List of Rhode Island Soldiers & Sailors for the names of those that served as 
guards at Newport. He does not specify whether or not individuals were on the night watch or daytime 
ward. 
 85 
Elites also participated in martial culture by joining artillery companies. As noted 
in the previous chapter, the function of these companies was largely ceremonial yet its 
members were exempted from mandatory militia service. After Newport’s artillery 
company had been chartered by the provincial legislature in 1741, Providence followed 
suit a few years later. These organizations were intended to be a “nursery of skillful 
officers” that would not only assist in case of an invasion but also “render the whole 
militia more useful and effectual.”178 However, like the Newport night watch and 
displays of power by the provincial government, artillery companies also served as a 
reassertion of elite prestige, clearly defining a “special niche” in the form of a martial 
“gentlemen’s club.”179 
 
Recruitment: Lures and Coercion 
 
Whether attempting to raise soldiers for an expedition abroad or for service at 
home, the Rhode Island’s provincial government used similar strategies. Voluntary 
service was consistently preferred over impressment but coercion was an option that was 
always kept in reserve as a viable alternative. Military historians of colonial America 
such as Ian K. Steele have rightly characterized the mid-eighteenth century as a period of 
commercial warfare where appeals to personal material self-interest ruled supreme;180 
however this characterization must include the caveat that the option of impressment was 
still alive and well and sometimes resorted to. Like the other British North American 
colonies, Rhode Island attempted to use the lure of bounties and prize privileges. From 
the very first expedition to the West Indies in 1740, the language of acquisition prevailed. 
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For instance, General Alexander Spotswood, a colonial officer from Virginia, assured 
Rhode Island governor Wanton that he would be a “strenuous stickler,” ensuring that the 
colony’s troops would receive “their due share of the booty.”181 This expedition and the 
two later ones against French Canada also utilized generous signing bounties for all 
soldiers that volunteered. In fact, Rhode Island’s bounties were constantly higher and 
generally offered earlier than in the other New England colonies.182 Bounties were never 
offered for service at Block Island or Fort George where the colonial government relied 
upon the inducement of wages instead. Volunteers stationed on Block Island were paid 
£3 for each month of service, while soldiers posted to Fort George were paid £4 per 
month with the gunner making £6. In 1744, the pay of those at Fort George was increased 
significantly, with regular soldiers receiving £8 and the gunner £10.183 These wages were 
certainly competitive given the fact that a soldier stationed at any one of the forts or 
blockhouses on Massachusetts’ much more isolated and volatile interior frontier was paid 
£40 a year.184 
Despite the prevalence of these relatively high monetary incentives, Rhode 
Island’s recruitment efforts for both service at home and abroad were usually sluggish. 
Captain Rice of the 1746 expedition wrote of “the great fatigue and slavery of recruiting” 
for his company while Governor Wanton bemoaned the “exhaust[ion] of men to an 
uncommon degree” when defending the colony’s difficulty in filling the ranks of its 
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companies for the Louisbourg campaign.185 As noted earlier, this shortage stood in stark 
contrast to the relative ease in recruiting experienced by a colony like Connecticut that 
was able to induce the service of several hundred men for the proposed 1746 expedition 
in a relatively short amount of time. There was also difficulty in procuring soldiers for 
Fort George after awhile. In June of 1742, the fort’s commander, John Cranston, pleaded 
for a pay raise from the initial £4 per month, citing how hard it was at the current rate to 
“procure” troops.186  
These shortages were due not only to the high casualty rate experienced during 
the West Indies expedition but also because of the strain on manpower that resulted from 
Newport being a thriving privateer base. An examination of privateer ships certified at 
Newport between 1745 and 1748 reveals that crew sizes could range anywhere from 25 
to 130 men, averaging around 80 per vessel. In 1746, Governor Greene estimated that 
there were around 3,000 Rhode Islanders involved in the war effort, the vast majority of 
which were serving aboard privateers.187 A single average sized privateer could employ 
almost as many men as one entire company of infantry and three or four times as many 
than were required at Fort George or Block Island.  
In the face of this perceived dire shortage of potential soldiers, the General 
Assembly enacted recruitment legislation that kept the use of impressment on the table in 
case quotas of troops could not be filled in a timely manner. Acts regarding the three 
expeditions, Fort George, and Block Island named impressment as an option. In contrast, 
neighboring Connecticut only considered impressment for the failed Canada expedition 
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in the latter part of the war, and never actually had to implement it.188 Rhode Island on 
the other hand, constantly considered the use of coercion for land forces and actually 
implemented the coercion of troops on two different occasions: for Louisbourg in 1745 
and Canada in 1746. The colony’s difficulty in enlisting soldiers highlights an enthusiasm 
gap that existed between the politicians wishing to display their imperial loyalty, the 
merchants of Newport who feared for the safety of their commerce, and the frightened 
inhabitants of Block Island, on one side, and the local militiamen and transient 
commoners who were often reluctant to be pried from their homes or trades. Provincial 
self-interest, composed of concerns for territorial integrity in terms of both the border 
dispute with Massachusetts and the threat of invasion from France or Spain, created a 
demand for soldiers in Rhode Island. The search for recruits to fulfill these provincial 
interests was largely undertaken in terms of appeals to the material interest of individuals. 
 
The Land versus the Sea  
The language and actions of commercialized warfare were only so successful on 
the land. It is at sea that the lure of wealth was significantly more successful. The few 
thousand men that served as crewmen, officers, surgeons, gunners, and other specialists 
aboard the colony’s numerous privateering vessels did not receive regular wages but 
instead were paid shares of captured prizes. Prizes, which were adjudicated by Admiralty 
Courts, were paid directly to the officers and crews of vessels after customs and the 
King’s “tenth” were deducted. These shares were usually quite lucrative; it is estimated 
that the average privateer sailor made more than double the monthly wage offered by 
merchant shipping and about six times more than the monthly rate paid to sailors serving 
                                                 
188
 Selesky, War & Society, 90-1. 
 89 
in the Royal Navy.189 Compared to the often clumsy recruiting of the colony’s land 
forces, privateers hailing from the Narragansett appear to have had little if any trouble in 
procuring adequate crews. “Skilled and responsible” sea captains, their reputations made 
by years of service in the merchant marine, were able to draw large numbers of men who 
sought substantial material rewards. As on the land, personal factors such as charisma 
and standing were essential characteristics of officers in terms of attracting recruits. The 
divergent results however lay in the potential to satisfy self-interests. While imperial 
expeditions could only offer bounties and a vague promise of plunder, privateering 
captains could point to a much more promising chance of earning substantial rewards. 
Manpower demands were also satisfied by push factors originating in Massachusetts, 
specifically Boston. Hundreds of seamen, seeking to avoid impressment gangs that tried 
to fill crews for the Royal Navy, the Louisbourg expedition, and Massachusetts’ coast 
guard vessels, headed to Rhode Island to serve aboard privateering ships.190  
The colony’s efforts at sea were also much more successful in terms of damages 
to the enemy. Rhode Island soldiers struggled to reach Louisbourg in time for the siege, 
were annihilated by death and disease in the Caribbean, and ran aground off of Martha’s 
Vineyard and Nantucket on their way to partake in the aborted Canada expedition. 
Privateers on the other hand seriously hindered the commerce of France and Spain. It is 
estimated that American-based privateers captured £7,531,000 worth of cargo from the 
French alone, about 30 percent of France’s total trade between 1739 and 1748. Rhode 
Island’s contribution to this effort was significant; about one quarter of all prize-capturing 
ships hailed from Newport. As a result, it is in terms of privateering that the American 
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colonies made their most significant contribution to the dual conflicts.191 Although New 
Englanders had successfully captured and held Louisbourg, it was returned to the French 
in the treaty that ended hostilities between the imperial powers. The same could not be 
said of the massive amounts of wealth garnered from French and Spanish shipping, much 
of which found its way into the pockets of Rhode Island customs officials, ship owners, 
officers, and sailors alike.  
 
Despite the vastly different amount of success in recruiting between privateer 
sailors and the colony’s land soldiers, the provincial government always favored appeals 
to individual self-interest, employing the high bounties and other material benefits to 
those that were willing to risk their lives for imperial expeditions and civil defense. 
Coercion, in the form of impressment, was certainly alive and well in the middle of the 
eighteenth century, but the commercial-minded elites that made up the colony’s 
governing institutions only employed it as a last resort. As for those who served, the 
patterns of corresponding military rank and socioeconomic status evident in Rhode Island 
during the dual conflicts are not without precedent. Selesky’s research regarding the 
backgrounds of both officers and enlisted soldiers in the colony of Connecticut reveals a 
fairly similar correlation.192 However the composition of the Ocean Colony’s contingents 
reflects a heavier maritime orientation, as seen by the participation of blacks, Indians, and 
more transient bachelors. The experience of the vast majority of officers and soldiers 
alike was far from exciting and glorious. Service in Rhode Island’s expeditionary 
companies usually involved a good deal of organizational disorder and death while 
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garrison and night watch service was relatively safe and mundane.  Nevertheless, an 
examination of their experiences reveals that the Ocean Colony was heavily invested in 
the dangers and politics of the dual conflicts. Rhode Island had a maritime frontier to 
defend and an imperial allegiance to prove.  
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Chapter 4: War and Society: Privateering Prisoners, Work, and the “Babel on the 
Narragansett” 
 
The dual conflicts that occurred between 1739 and 1748 affected and involved 
Rhode Islanders in a number of ways, many beyond the traditionally studied and more 
visible realms of colonial government and soldiering. These experiences have often been 
overlooked and range from the integration of war into the everyday rhythms of life and 
work in the colony to the sometimes-surprising ways that a seemingly imperial conflict 
made its presence known. In particular, this section will focus on the presence of French 
and Spanish prisoners who were hosted and held within Newport, the labor and 
commerce related to the colony’s participation in the two wars, and the sectarian religious 
dimension. All of these areas illustrate the involvement of people who were neither 
politicians, soldiers, officers, nor sailors, thereby highlighting the ways that violence and 
warfare were felt far beyond the immediate sites of battle in colonial America in the mid-
eighteenth century. 
 
Privateering Captives: Human Prizes 
 
When Dr. Alexander Hamilton visited Newport, a town “famous for 
privateering,” in the middle of July of 1744, he made note of a captured Spanish ship 
lying in the harbor with its bowsprit “shot off.”193  In addition to such material prizes 
there was a corresponding influx of captured people. Unlike the wealth and glory brought 
by privateering plunder, prisoners, which included officers, crews and a ship’s passengers 
proved to be rather burdensome to those tasked with their supervision, boarding, and 
care. The problem of prisoners was experienced in Rhode Island at an unprecedented 
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scale for the colony, as Newport had been a much smaller privateering base during the 
last imperial conflict, Queen Anne’s War. The experience of French and Spanish 
prisoners being held captive in colonial American ports has been largely ignored by 
secondary literature. Works concerned with privateering have either been 
overwhelmingly interested in actions at sea or have investigated the material wealth 
captured during such engagements. Although several recent works have addressed the 
hardships and meaning of captivity in colonial North America, they have focused 
primarily on the British, Anglo-Americans, and Indians.194  
Captives taken by privateers from either captured vessels or during the course of 
shore raids proved to be a burden to their captors as well; prisoners required not only 
control but also food, water, and space, which could be at a premium aboard crowded 
ships. Privateers usually held unusually large crews as to be able to man captured prize 
vessels. As a result, it was not unusual for prisoners to be set free before privateers set 
sail for their voyages back to their home ports. However, captured officers and crew were 
sometimes brought to Admiralty courts where they were called upon as witnesses to 
determine the division of plunder. The commissions privateers received from the colonial 
governors heavily regulated their conduct and the treatment of prisoners was no 
exception. Captured persons were prohibited from being killed in “cold blood,” tortured, 
hurt, or otherwise “inhumanely treated.” Furthermore, any “abuse” of women being held 
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captive was taken seriously. Offenders would be immediately denied their share of prizes 
and a disciplinary committee could issue further reprimands. 195  
 Once back in Newport, prisoners could expect to either be held in the town’s jail, 
aboard ships or to be boarded at private residences. While most officers, women, and 
children were placed in private households, ordinary crewmen, captured slaves,” and 
some “gentlemen” were placed in His Majesty’s prison or slept aboard ships in the 
harbor.196  In addition to James Davis, the Newport jailer, several other men played host 
to Spanish and French prisoners. John Potter served as the sheriff for Newport County 
until his death in 1744. Daniel Goddard was a carpenter, a maker of both houses and 
furniture. Isaac Anthony was also an artisan. Trained as a goldsmith in Boston, Anthony 
was a Quaker that kept a public house in Newport and was involved in several private 
lottery schemes. All were freemen of the colony; a relatively high social footing that 
matched the status of their guests. Perhaps these men were lured by the supplemental 
income that could be earned by boarding officers and gentlemen until their exchange or 
return was worked out. 
 Perhaps the most notable of those held at Newport was the infamous Spanish 
privateering captain, Francisco Loranzo, who had been captured by the Rhode Island-
based Revenge off of the north coast of Cuba in 1741. While many hosted prisoners were 
either captured ship captains or other such “gentlemen,” hosts also were given charge of 
women and children.  For instance Goddard hosted a French couple and their two 
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children and another married French pair. The durations of stay for these types of 
prisoners could last anywhere from several weeks to several months. In addition to the 
burden of providing room and board, many of the French and Spanish that ended up in 
Newport households required additional care. Like the battered Spanish ship observed by 
Dr. Hamilton, some prisoners were wounded and or sick. Sheriff Potter, who had been 
directed to host Captain Loranzo by the governor, reported that the privateer was a “great 
trouble” because of the “infirm” state of his health. Likewise French prisoners kept by the 
jailer, James Davis, were very sick and needed assistance walking. The trouble of caring 
for such ailing prisoners was more than the General Assembly had anticipated; it was not 
uncommon for hosts to petition the legislature for additional funds to cover expenses that 
went above and beyond initial compensation. Besides being a burden to individual hosts 
and their families, these prisoners were yet another financial cost of the dual conflicts that 
had to be paid from the Rhode Island treasury. Expenses were high as they included not 
only board, but “washing,” food, firewood, candles, and the cost of hiring ships to 
transport them back to their respective colonies in either the West Indies or Canada.197  
Hosted prisoners seem to have enjoyed at least some degree of freedom. Dr. 
Hamilton writes of socializing with both French and Spanish prisoners. One such 
encounter occurred at a coffee house in Newport where he spoke with several Spanish 
prisoners.198 A Spanish captain held for ten weeks during the summer of 1742 was 
provided with liquor while a group of Spanish officers were provided with “drink” during 
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their multiple month stay.199 Despite the needs of prisoners sometimes exceeding the 
initial expectations of the colonial governments and their hosts, the hospitality of the 
Rhode Islanders seems to have been duly noted. One of the men that Dr. Hamilton 
conversed with in Newport, Don Manuel, spoke “very much in praise of [Newport], the 
civility and humanity of the people, and the charms of the ladies.” In a reversal of roles, a 
Spanish captain that had been held at Rhode Island earlier in the war ended up capturing 
a Newport-based privateering ship, the Lee. He remarked, “he had received such usage” 
at Rhode Island “as to induce him to declare that he made a point of treating all Rhode 
Island seamen with compassion.”200 
The experience of ordinary sailors and slaves who were captured by the colony’s 
privateering fleet seems to have been less pleasant than the socializing and hospitality 
lavished on French and Spanish officers and gentlemen. There is no evidence of captured 
sailors being hosted in private households; they appear to have been restricted to prisons 
or kept aboard ships. Their dissatisfaction is evinced by the fact that a number of Spanish 
sailors and slaves plotted a failed escape attempt. A privateering ship was to be seized 
during the night of January 30, 1742 but an irresolute captive that informed his captors of 
the plot before it could get into motion foiled the plan.201 Captured slaves that were 
aboard seized prize vessels certainly experienced little to no degree of liberty as they 
were treated as captured cargoes and resold. Even captives who were not nominally 
slaves could fear being sold into servitude. A captured French Jesuit, who was held 
aboard the Prince Charles of Lorraine, after his mission was ransacked and plundered by 
that privateering ship, recounted how the ship’s captain, Simeon Potter, related to him 
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how he intended to treat captured indigenous West Indians as slaves.202 Another Rhode 
Island captain, John Dennis, was caught “making slaves of” twenty-two free black 
Spanish subjects that had been aboard a captured prize vessel in 1746. These men were 
brought back to the colony and sold as property, some going as far as Pennsylvania and 
New York. Once this transgression had been brought to light, the provincial government 
quickly acted to apprehend the wrongly enslaved individuals and return them to the West 
Indies. The fear of being sold back into slavery plagued free blacks throughout colonial 
America. Being a prisoner of war in a strange new country certainly heightened such 
worries. Writing to the governor of Havana, Rhode Island governor Greene stated, “such 
acts of violence and injustice through the selfishness of private persons are not among the 
least calamities of war.”203  
 
Maritime Trades 
 
 Brazen acts of selfishness tied to the handling of prisoners were further evident in 
the truce ships that were used to dispatch captives back to their homes. In 1748, the 
Admiralty commissioners located in Boston found that over twenty ships commissioned 
by Rhode Island during the conflict were engaged in smuggling with the French West 
Indies. Ships meant to carry redeemed prisoners were also loaded with fish and other 
“provisions” for sale to the French plantations. The French colonials reciprocated by 
loading returning vessels and their own truce ships) that were intended to carry English 
captives) with sugar, molasses, and indigo. Like Greene, the Admiralty officials were 
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outraged at the “base prostitution of the King’s commission.”204 This illicit trade with the 
enemy is just another example of the ways that private self-interest colored the conduct of 
individuals involved in the nearly decade long span of war. Some merchants were not 
above providing subsistence to the enemy as they attempted to continue a West Indian 
trade that had prospered between the colony and the Caribbean before the inconvenient 
outbreak of hostilities. Imperial boundaries proved to be rather porous in the face of such 
capitalist trade. For the colonial merchants involved, commercial allegiances forged 
through business ties surpassed any sense of British imperial loyalty. As for the imperial 
metropole, they surely must have expected such smuggling. In a 1739 letter to from the 
Duke of Newcastle to the Governor of Rhode Island that encouraged the use of 
privateers, Newcastle warned that the provincial government “should be very rigorous 
and severe in preventing any ammunition or stores of any kind from being carried to the 
Spaniards.”205 Despite these warnings and the findings made in 1748, the British seems to 
have taken little if any steps toward punishment.  
 The adaptation of pre-existing patterns of work to war occurred in a variety of 
much less insidious and treacherous ways. In terms of the maritime trades, privateering 
should be seen as a variation of the colony’s shipping industry that prospered before the 
outbreak of hostilities. It required not only experienced ship captains but also the skills of 
a savvy merchant class. These professionals utilized large amounts of capital, knowledge 
of markets, pre-existing facilities, and their ability to attract investors in order to enable 
the success of high-risk voyages. Clearly privateering was not the pursuit of zealous 
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amateurs.206 Nor was it contained to the crews, officers, and investors of the vessels 
directly involved. Privateering was tied to a plethora of other areas and trades. 
Shipbuilders, providers of naval stores, dock workers, and suppliers of food and drink 
were all touched commercially by Rhode Island’s role as one of the premier privateering 
bases in North America. The colony had been engaged in shipbuilding since the 
seventeenth century. Between 1698 and 1708 alone, over a hundred ships had been built. 
By 1771, the Ocean Colony would be building over eight percent of all ships constructed 
in British North America, the third largest producer behind Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire. These ships tended to be smaller than vessels constructed elsewhere in 
British America, a mean size of about thirty tons, but their output was much more 
prolific. These ships were not only used by the Newport and Providence merchant fleets, 
but were also sold to outside merchant communities.207 Lawyers and others in the legal 
profession were also closely linked to the industry as prizes were brought before 
Admiralty courts to be certified, divided, and argued over.208 Doctors were another 
common feature, with many private ships employing a surgeon. The colony’s General 
Assembly followed suit; the colony sloop, the Tartar, also hired a doctor in June of 
1746.209 
 The colony’s heavy pre-war involvement in shipping was also drawn upon in the 
procurement of transport vessels for the three imperial expeditions in which Rhode Island 
participated. Although the provincial government had reserved the right to impress 
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private ships for military use since 1667,210 it seems to have preferred to hire transports 
on a much more contractual basis. The chartering of ships was one of the expenses that 
was explicitly not reimbursed by the British metropole and as a result was one of the 
most costly to the colony. For instance, in 1740 the General Assembly paid over £1,000 
for the hiring of a brigantine for the Spanish West Indies expedition from Joseph 
Whipple, one of the most prominent merchants in Newport. Similarly, the government 
hired another brigantine, the Success, at £380 per month in 1745 as part of the flotilla 
destined for Louisbourg. It was not until 1746 and the expedition intended for the 
invasion of French Canada that the General Assembly exercised the impressment of 
ships. This change in policy was most likely caused by the degree of royal pressure being 
applied to the provincial government and the important phase of arbitration that the 
border dispute with Massachusetts had recently entered. Even in this instance the owners 
of the three transport ships were provided with monetary compensation. It should be 
noted that this critical juncture of the conflict appears to be the only instance that the 
government impressed labor; the sheriff of Newport was ordered to impress laborers to 
repair and outfit the ships. 211 
 
Expeditionary Provisions and Civil Defense Work 
 Like the colony’s privateering industry, the three expeditions created demands for 
goods that were filled, at least in part, by local merchants, artisans, and farmers. The 
accounts for the supplies of these expeditions reveal that beef, pork, flour, hammocks, 
cheese, sheep, iron, salt, sugar, and 335 gallons of rum were required in one such 
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transaction alone.212 Beef and cheese were important commodities to the more rural 
sections of the colony. These areas acted as a hinterland to the ports of Providence and 
Newport, making the raising of livestock both a serious and profitable endeavor. One 
such example would be the locally raised cattle, in the proximity of Westerly, that were 
slaughtered for the Louisbourg expedition in 1745.213 Liquor, specifically rum, was also 
locally produced but on a much larger scale. Using molasses imported from the West 
Indies, Rhode Islanders excelled at creating their own rum. It was sold to other British 
American ports in exchange for currency that was used toward procuring finished goods 
from Britain. Some was also traded to the Caribbean plantation colonies for sugar and 
molasses. However the bulk of the colony’s liquor went to Africa where it was 
exchanged for slaves. By the mid 1700s, Newport alone had sixteen distilleries and was 
exporting around 150,000 gallons of rum annually to the west coast of Africa. Rum 
production was also tied to illegitimate commerce; the 1733 Molasses Act severely drove 
up the prices of British-made molasses, causing merchants to smuggle this key ingredient 
from Britain’s imperial rivals in the West Indies.214  
Expeditions also required muskets for the soldiers who were unable to provide 
their own arms. By 1746 the colony’s supply of these arms seems to have been exhausted 
as they were forced to purchase them. This procurement was accompanied by the hiring 
of gunsmiths to repair those muskets that had been deemed “not good.”215 Also like 
privateering, the raising of troops required legal services, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
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For instance, a justice of the peace of Providence County was paid the sum of £5 for 
administering “oaths of allegiance” to the company of soldiers raised in that county for 
the impending expedition to the West Indies in 1741.216  
Above all, companies required men, and as the colony always favored inducement 
over coercion, recruitment materials were a must. For this purpose, the General Assembly 
relied on Ann Franklin, the official printer of the colony, usually responsible for printing 
law books and other official documents, to print “proclamations and extracts of letters for 
encouragement of soldiers and seamen to enlist.” Franklin was the sister-in-law of 
Benjamin Franklin, had run her husband’s printing business for decades after his illness 
and subsequent death. She also produced a variety of non-official documents, such as 
almanacs, mercantile advertisements, sermons, and British literature. In 1758, she began 
printing a newspaper, The Newport Mercury, and would go on to become America’s first 
female newspaper editor.217 
 In addition to the war effort abroad, the civil defense of the colony also required 
the services of local workers, both skilled and menial. These efforts centered on Fort 
George, which was constantly being repaired and added on to. On two different occasions 
the General Assembly’s committee for the fort hired the service of architects to prepare 
drafts of the structure and surrounding harbor. The Assembly was so impressed with the 
“handsome” and “very ingeniously drawn” draft that they received in 1745 that they 
voted and resolved to give special thanks to the brothers Joseph and Peter Harrison for 
their service. Peter Harrison, who was hired a second time to reproduce the original draft 
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so that it may be sent to Britain to show the state of the fortification to an ordinance 
committee,218 would go on to be one of the most accomplished architects in New 
England, designing churches and homes of high profile colonists. The series of repairs of 
that was made to fort was done by a combination of the paid soldiers already stationed at 
the fort, soldiers enlisted specifically for construction work, and paid “artificers.”219 The 
fact that all of this work was done on a hired basis contrasts greatly with the 
contemporary reliance upon slave labor in colonies such as South Carolina or the corvée 
system in New France, which were utilized for fortifications and public works projects. 
220
  
 Although pre-existing local laborers and professionals took up much of the work 
generated by the nine years of imperial warfare, the conflicts created several unique  new 
occupational opportunities. Perhaps the most demanding of which was the position of 
commissary, a salaried post charged with purchasing supplies, distributing the wages of 
soldiers and officers, tallying stockpiles of arms and goods, and keeping an account of all 
the war-related expenses incurred by the colony. This position was temporary and only 
came into being during a state of war. It was a rather prestigious position that blended 
military service, commerce, and civil responsibility. The legislature awarded the post to 
both prominent civilians, such as the doctor John Hoyle of Providence and the merchant 
Jahleel Brenton of Newport, and holders of militia rank, such as Colonel John Gardner. 
Initially, commissaries were hired specifically for the expedition to the West Indies or for 
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the outfitting of the Tartar. This would change by 1744 with the beginning of war with 
France; a fulltime commissary was now hired by the General Assembly.221 Towards the 
end of the war, the commissary was charged with closing out the colony’s military 
affairs. Gardner was ordered to place the Tartar up for auction in October of 1748 and in 
June of 1749 a commissary was ordered to round up all of the small arms belonging to 
the colony and deposit them in the state house.222 Like the stowed away weapons, 
Commissaries would remain unused until the outbreak of the French and Indian War. 
 New tasks and opportunities for income also came to those already holding 
established positions. When the need for manpower became acute and the lures of wages 
and bounties proved too weak, sheriffs were ordered to impress men for the Louisbourg 
and Canada expeditions and for the crewing of the captured French vessel, the Vigilant. 
The General Assembly voted to award Joseph Scott, the sheriff of Newport County, his 
deputy, William Dyer, and their press gang a financial reward for stopping ferries and 
impressing soldiers and sailors. Men were also impressed in Providence by a county 
militia ensign and transported to Newport. The dangerous nature of this undertaking is 
evident in that a member of one of the pressgangs had “received a desperate wound” that 
required him to be boarded and attended to for a period of four weeks.223 Sometimes 
when an occupation involved with war did not yet exist, there were people willing to step 
forward and offer their services to the government in return for compensation. In August 
of 1746, before the three doomed transports set sail for the equally abortive expedition 
against Canada, three men took it upon themselves to offer their services as stewards 
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aboard the transport ships.224 In the same vein, a Mr. Joseph Cowley petitioned the 
Assembly in order to be made a paid Spanish interpreter at Newport because of the 
“diverse prizes” being brought into the port. He claimed to have known the language for 
“some years” and offered his services for the Board of Admiralty and anywhere else his 
services may be needed.225 Although it is unclear whether or not the government accepted 
the offers from these individuals, this eagerness along with the above mentioned war-
related work, serve as examples of the types of self-interest that were in play as the 
colony went to war, speaking of the commercial opportunism within Rhode Island’s 
culture at the middle of the eighteenth-century. 
 
“The Babel on the Narragansett” Goes to War 
Participation in the wars, whether through work, administration, or outright 
soldiering can be viewed through a religious lens as well. Sydney James aptly dubbed the 
colony’s well-known  (and sometimes contemporarily viewed as infamous) religious 
diversity the “Babel on Narragansett Bay.”226 In 1739, Babel went to war, and virtually 
every sect present within the borders of Rhode Island was involved. This should be 
interpreted not only as an indication that sectarian multiplicity was alive and well but that 
members of each religious community were able to partake in the trappings, profits, 
power, and prestige of warfare. Between 1739 and 1748, no single denomination was 
able to claim a monopoly on either the perquisites or hardships associated with nearly a 
decade of conflict. Like the officers that were examined earlier in this study, the diversity 
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of the colony’s religious sects was just as evident among commissaries, politicians, ship 
owners, and a variety of others engaged in the dual conflicts. 
Anglicans were one such group that would appear to be a likely candidate for 
such dominance during a period of imperial war. The Church of England was the 
imperial religion. It was propagated by elites who desired closer ties to the metropole and 
leverage over those belonging to other sects. Anglicans caused and benefited from greater 
integration into the empire.227 Rhode Island was no exception. In a colony where social 
distinctions, in the form of groups and their desires, often matched denomination, 
Anglicans tended to be the rich and powerful. This included the small number of royally 
appointed officials and a number of lawyers.228 Largely absent from the early years of 
settlement, Anglicanism slowly developed in the early eighteenth century. The 
impressive Trinity Church in Newport was completed in 1726 and congregations existed 
throughout the colony by mid-century. Several of the officers of the expeditionary 
companies belonged to the Episcopal churches, including Captain Edward Cole and 
Lieutenant Philip Wilkinson, as did Walter Chaloner, an officer who served at Fort 
George and in the Caribbean. As could be expected, they also held important war-related 
positions within the government. Men such as Peter Bours and Ezbon Sanford, members 
of Trinity Church, were involved in committees that prepared the colony for war. Further 
confirmation of the association between Anglicanism and provincial elites is evident in 
the ownership of privateering vessels. The majority of owners, who were usually 
merchants, can be identified as belonging to Episcopal churches.229 
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Despite the presence of Anglicans in several key positions, they by no means had 
a strangle hold or even majority in the top ranks of the military and government. For 
instance, the Baptists, a major dissenting sect during this period, were also present in the 
upper echelons. Captain Samuel Dunn had been selected by the legislature to command 
one of the companies that served in the Spanish West Indies while John Gardner had 
been chosen to serve as the colony’s commissary and was a member of military-related 
committees. Richard Ward, a member of Seventh Day Baptist Church in Newport, was 
chosen as governor from 1740 until 1743. Baptists had been a significant presence since 
the earliest years of settlement and were dispersed throughout Newport, Providence, 
Block Island and the smaller towns beyond Narragansett Bay.230  
Members of smaller and much more obscure dissenting sects were also involved 
in the war effort. Dr. John Hoyle, the prominent Providence gentleman who had been 
selected as the commissary for the West Indies expedition was a Unitarian while another 
of the commissaries, for Louisbourg, James Angell, was a Gortonist. The Gortonists 
migrated to the Narragansett country from the Plymouth colony in the latter part of the 
seventeenth century and believed in a doctrine of “Familism,” a “mystical communion 
with the Holy Spirit” that could potentially result in “a life without sin.”231 Even the 
miniscule yet visible Jewish community was involved. Although denied full citizenship 
because of their faith, Rhode Island’s Jews were one of the rare tolerated and thus 
noticeable Jewish communities in British North America. Samuel Cohen was a common 
soldier that died during one of the harsh winters experienced by the Louisbourg garrison. 
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Moses Lopez, a prominent merchant of Newport and part-owner of a privateering vessel, 
was undoubtedly involved in communications in regards to prisoners and privateering 
prizes since he had translated Spanish for the provincial government for a number of 
years during the dual conflicts.232 
Perhaps the most surprising participants in Rhode Island’s war effort, given their 
usual association with pacifism, were the Quakers. Quaker pacifism had been 
compromised on an individual basis on several occasions in earlier colonial conflicts. For 
instance, John Wanton, future governor of the colony, had been instrumental in the 
capture of a menacing French privateer ship off of the coast of Block Island during 
Queen Anne’s War. Such service on an individual basis was the result of the absence of a 
distinctive Quaker political bloc. In Rhode Island, the Society of Friends had not 
experienced the persecution that was common of their sect in the rest of New England, 
allowing Quakers to be elected to a variety of political positions. The price of this 
inclusion and participation was the potential for the peace testimony to be challenged by 
duties and requirements of office.233  The role of the Friends was most visible in the 
officer of Governor. The Quakers John and William Wanton were elected to the 
governorship for roughly half of the years of the wars. Their office challenged the peace 
testimony by making them commission officers and privateers, organize expeditions and 
home defenses, and preside over the coercion of impressment. The colony’s lobbyist in 
London, Richard Partridge, was also of the denomination, and was instrumental in 
defending Rhode Island’s war record and requesting armaments. In addition, at least a 
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few of the owners of privateering vessels appear to have been Quakers, or at the least 
from known Quaker families. For instance, Stephen Hopkins, a future signer of the 
Declaration of Independence and brother of Captain William Hopkins, the (non-Quaker) 
captain of one of the Caribbean expeditionary companies, was part owner of two different 
privateering ships. Both were named Reprisal and sailed out of Providence. 
Participation of Quaker non-elites seems to have been much more limited, 
involving work rather than soldiering. The accomplished architect, Peter Harrison, who 
was instrumental in the drafting and planning of the additions to Fort George, was a 
Friend. It should be noted that Quaker participation in local militias was still exempt 
during this time; unarmed service was mandated in a defense act by the General 
Assembly at the beginning of hostilities but the service of Quakers as scouts, lookouts, 
firemen, and messengers never appears to have gone beyond words on paper. Those that 
did participate appear to have been done so without sanction from their religious 
communities.234 This contrasted sharply with the experience of conscientious objectors in 
other colonies north and east of Pennsylvania, the Quaker stronghold in British America. 
In these colonies, where they were largely excluded from provincial governments, they 
were often coerced into service during the dual conflicts. In New Hampshire they were 
not exempt from compulsory militia service, their peace testimony directly violated. 
Friends in the Hudson Valley region of New York faced similar requirements. In 
Massachusetts, pacifists in Barnstable and Bristol, the latter town being in the midst of 
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the border dispute with Rhode Island, were forced to serve; those that refused were 
imprisoned or held until they paid a considerable ransom.235 
 
 
Whether coordinating the war effort from the Colony House in Newport, selling 
provisions for an impending expedition, serving aboard a privateer, repairing Fort 
George, or enlisting as a soldier at home or abroad, King George’s War and the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear produced ripples that were felt in virtually every corner of Rhode Island 
society. Those that participated either directly or indirectly represented a cross-section of 
society. Not only did the Babel on the Narragansett go to war but people within the 
highest ranks of the elite, such as the merchants and politicians, in the middling classes of 
printers and artisans, and the lower classes of sailors and transient workers, were engaged 
in both civil defense and expeditions abroad, motivated by self-interests ranging from the 
monetary to political. The relationship between war and society at this time also 
highlights the Atlantic context in which Rhode Island was heavily integrated into. 
Maritime trades, the hosting of captives, the competition for manpower, and smuggling 
were features of the colony’s orientation toward the sea and the wider world. The self-
interests of all levels of colonial society were certainly provincial in that individuals and 
institutions were based in colonial towns, ports, and hinterlands, but their concerns 
reached far beyond the borders and shores of the Ocean Colony, connecting them not 
only to distant enemies, but far-flung trading partners, customers, religious communities, 
and governing bodies. 
                                                 
235
 Ibid, 133-5; CCGRI II, 2. 
 111 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This study has attempted to identify and dissect the various self-interests involved 
in the colony of Rhode Island as it was thrust into nearly a decade of imperial warfare. 
Provincially, the colonial government, was largely concerned with both territorial 
security at home and its own particular mercantile interests. It was vying with 
Massachusetts for a small yet commercially important strip of land that included the port 
of Bristol and the Attleboro Gore. Political vulnerabilities also existed with the metropole 
in the shape of pending legislation that threatened the colony’s monetary policies, charter 
privileges, and commercial well-being. Added to this atmosphere of threat were the very 
real possibilities of raids and even invasion, made real by a geography that left points 
such as Block Island and the southern coastal towns, particularly Newport, exposed to the 
Spanish and French. As a result, the government had to conduct a complex balancing act 
that addressed civil defense, political pressures, and limited resources, monetary as well 
as human. Rhode Island wanted to display its imperial loyalty, but in a way that advanced 
its own self-interests and did not neglect its own insecurities. In handling the affairs of 
war, provincial elites were able to expand and display their powers. For instance, the 
power to select militia officers had been appropriated by the legislature and the Assembly 
had granted charters for the first time. This expansion of provincial power appears to 
have either been unnoticed or ignored by the British metropole. Throughout the dual 
conflicts, the Royal Navy remained absent from Newport and Providence and the 
colony’s charter remained fully intact.  
The many individuals involved with the war effort were also concerned with their 
own self-interests. Many men who became officers were able to advance their own 
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careers by creating a martial element to their repertoire or expounding upon their military 
backgrounds. Merchants, shippers, tradesmen, interpreters, sheriffs, and hosts of 
prisoners were tied to war by monetary inducements, a component of work that touched a 
wide cross-section of society. This cross-section displayed the cosmopolitan diversity of 
the ocean colony, as whites, blacks, Indians, Quakers, Anglicans, and Jews were all 
participating in the dual conflicts.  In analyzing the interests in play, this study has not 
only touched upon military history, but has also highlighted political and social 
components. 
 In terms of military history, this work has provided a much needed, yet only 
partial, insight into the narrative of the wars of 1739-1748. Whereas the current 
historiography glosses over, neglects, or demeans the complicated involvement of Rhode 
Island, this study has tried to offer a more nuanced explanation in regards to its apparent 
lack of participation. Rhode Island did play a significant role, both close to home as it 
favored Newport over Louisbourg, and on the high seas, contributing a plethora of ships 
and thousands of men to privateering. As Carl Swanson reminds us, privateering was the 
most important contribution that the American colonies offered during this period. 
Privateering, with its large drain on manpower and use of volunteer labor, hindered and 
shaped the ways that war was waged.  Land forces were much more scarce, causing the 
colony to resort to offering the highest bounties in New England to fill out companies, 
and the use of impressment was reserved and sometimes used as a viable alternative. 
While military scholars such as Kyle Zelner place the use of coercion squarely in the 
seventeenth century, the practice was still alive and well, both on paper and sometimes in 
practice, throughout mid eighteenth-century Rhode Island. This shows that this period 
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was one of fluctuation between the impressments of a conflict such as King Philip’s War 
and the largely volunteer nature of the armies of the French and Indian War and 
American Revolution. Deficiencies were not limited to manpower but also extended to 
provincially owned vessels, fortifications, and available funding (that had already been 
printed). Consequently, it would be incorrect to label this period as being the “pinnacle of 
colonial arms,” as Ian K. Steele and Howard Selesky have done.236 Commercial warfare 
certainly had its limits; politics, imperial and provincial, created demands that could not 
always be met by offering financial incentives. As a result, the waging of war proved to 
be a major dilemma for at least one of the New England colonies.  
Light has also been shed on the issue of colonial militia. One of the most pre-
eminent scholars of colonial American warfare, John Shy, reminds us that militias should 
not be viewed as being static institutions. He urges that they be viewed in terms of 
specific threat types and particular places. For Rhode Island, facing the twin challenges 
of a maritime frontier and imperial expeditions, militias were used rather indirectly. 
Officers in coastal areas were used to supervise garrisons and nightly watches, while 
expeditionary companies attempted to use militias as sources of manpower. In this latter 
instance, the findings from the section on the colony’s ground forces coincide with Shy’s 
suggestion that New England companies sent abroad were largely composed of single, 
relatively lower-class men, who may also be black or American Indian.237  
 Politically, this thesis has sought to highlight the importance of intra-colonial 
conflict. For the governor, General Assembly, and colonial agent, Massachusetts was just 
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as much if not more of an enemy as France and Spain ever were. That colony’s governor, 
the imperial-minded William Shirley, surfaced again and again as Rhode Island’s primary 
antagonist as he sought to belittle the colony’s contribution and curtail its printing of 
money. His ire was motivated not only the boundary dispute, but also his belief, whether 
real or imagined, that Rhode Island was sheltering deserters from Bristol and seamen 
from Boston. Whereas orthodox Congregationalist New England had viewed the colony 
with contempt for being a haven for religious rogues, this reputation still held up in a 
military context in the middle of the seventeenth century.  
Rhode Island’s contest with Massachusetts and its other self-interests led many to 
identify with the provincial rather than the North American or imperial. After all it was 
the General Assembly in Newport that was looking after the welfare of local merchants 
and inhabitants in places such as Block Island, not London or Boston. The place of 
provincial political actions and allegiance deserves more attention in the framework of 
imperial and Atlantic war. Fred Anderson argues that the everyday, mundane experiences 
of Massachusetts’ troops during the French and Indian War served to unite colonials 
while fostering a deterioration of loyalty to the British.238 While such personal 
interactions between Rhode Island’s forces and British regulars were limited and usually 
positive, a similar process of shared provincial identity and imperial tension at the level 
of colonial government took place. These findings contrast greatly with recent assertions 
made by Ann M. Little, a scholar of the colonial wars in New England. She asserts that 
participation by New Englanders fostered imperial pride and British nationalism and was 
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motivated in part by anti-Catholic rhetoric.239 Certainly Rhode Islanders were more 
integrated into the empire due to the dual conflicts, but perhaps the phrase used by 
Sydney James, “imperial vortex,” is more apt; for better or worse, the colony and its 
colonists were dragged into the conflicts. Their participation seems to have had very little 
do with religious motivations (given the colony’s religious plurality, this is not 
surprising) or a nascent British nationalism. Although some men who served as officers 
went on to be loyalists during the Revolution, the dual conflicts were largely understood 
and dealt with in a provincial context. 
 The colony’s larger society responded in much the same way that its political 
leaders did, participating in self-interested ways. For many, war meant work, and the 
most mercantile of colonies responded by supplying provisions, chartering ships, and so 
on. This commercial warfare was especially vigorous in Rhode Island because the 
interests of those in power and those trying to make a living were often congruent. As a 
result, there was very little pressure between elites and the rest of society. Individual 
agency flourished for the most part, perhaps more so in the ocean colony than in the rest 
of New England. This is because Rhode Island was “Yankee” long before its neighbors to 
the north and east. While colonies such as Connecticut experienced a “conflict between 
[personal] ambition and traditional authority” during the transition from “Puritan to 
Yankee” in the eighteenth century,240 Rhode Island followed a different development 
since it had never had an established church. Its social order was already orientated 
toward individual objectives, both religiously and economically. Fantastically successful 
merchants and transient laborers responded in similar ways, whether they were launching 
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privateer cruises or signing up to receive a generous bounty for service in Canada or the 
West Indies. Risks were taken in the name of the pound. In addition, this study serves as 
a reminder that a topic seemingly militaristic in topic can also be examined socially. Even 
conflicts such as the War of Jenkins’ Ear and King George’s War created ripples that 
were felt beyond the shores of South America and Atlantic Canada, as even imperial 
warfare affected the day-to-day lives and livelihoods of those back at home. 
 Despite these much needed glimpses into the military, political, and social aspects 
of Rhode Island’s participation in the dual conflicts, a few areas warranting further study 
are brought to the forefront. Perhaps most in need of further study is the existence of the 
highly volatile maritime frontier that existed along coastal colonial North America. 
Historians interested in the wars of the colonial period have focused almost exclusively 
on the interior borderland regions, such as the frontier between New England and New 
France. The stretches of coast between Long Island and Maine and beyond provide an 
equally dangerous and exposed region, one ripe for further synthesis and an analysis. A 
frontier, as defined by Gregory H. Nobles, “is a region in which no culture, group, or 
government can claim effective control or hegemony over others,” in which “contact 
often involves conflict.”241 The coasts of Rhode Island certainly fall under this category. 
It was a frontier where peninsulas and points were home to warning fires and watch 
houses, ports had watch patrols and forts, and a sparsely settled island begged for a 
protective garrison. The provincial government and merchant community were in 
constant fear of invasion or raid from its Spanish and French foes, resulting in a constant 
effort to maintain security and control while enjoying the material benefits of trade and 
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smuggling and playing host to a large body of privateering prisoners. A thorough study of 
such a dynamic region could transcend provincial and imperial lines to touch on areas 
such as littoral societies, civil defense, and a coastal culture that may have more in 
common with other coastal societies than their inland counterparts, as advocated by 
Michael Pearson.  
A second area of study that could be expounded upon is the relationship between 
Rhode Island’s brand of warfare and gender. Little’s study of masculinity is 
overwhelmingly concerned with the (inland) northeastern borderlands.242 Did maritime 
mercantile interests in Rhode Island mirror the developments she covers? If so how were 
they the same or different? I suggest that the ocean colony was less interested in the 
nationalist and religious components of the imperial conflicts, but it is still possible that 
the methodologies of historians of gender and sexuality could be applied to the colony in 
question. Lastly, the subaltern elements of imperial warfare warrant further scholarship. 
Although some attention has been paid to the men involved in the various expeditionary 
companies, further archival work could be done to further explore the experience of 
soldiers dispatched well beyond the North American mainland colonies. In addition, the 
experiences of the women and children they sometimes left behind needs to be integrated 
into the narrative of imperial colonial warfare. Likewise, the experiences of subaltern 
prisoners, such as sailors and captured slaves, held in the English colonies are an area of 
work ripe for historical study. 
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 After specifically considering Rhode Island’s response to the wars of 1739-1748, 
how useful is the colony as a case study for broader themes? After all, the colony was 
quite unique in regards to its religion, relatively free government, small size, and heavily 
urban-commercial character. Despite such exceptionalism, this study has highlighted 
several areas that are applicable to other New England, British, and North American 
locations. For instance, Rhode Island was not alone in its hosting of large-scale 
privateering operations. Ports such as Philadelphia, New York, and Charleston were also 
major privateering bases. The existence of these bases certainly affected how provincial 
governments conducted war, well beyond the mere acts of privateers themselves. 
Likewise, the interaction between mercantile interests and the demands of the wars were 
obviously not limited to Rhode Island but are exemplified by its study. Merchant 
concerns and involvement were factors in virtually every colony; colonies that largely 
existed for trade in the first place. Broad issues of different kinds of self-interest must 
have been relevant to war efforts up and down the eastern seaboard during the dual 
conflicts. For instance, border disputes were fairly common during the colonial era. New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts were also engaged in a dispute over land around the 
Merrimack River, a dispute that was settled in 1741.Other such issues of provincial, 
personal, and commercial self-interest can certainly be identified in the other colonies 
that were plunged into nearly a decade of conflict, coloring the ways that they responded 
both at home and abroad.243 Rhode Island’s various self-interests that shaped its waging 
of war were certainly unique, but their existence was part of a much larger trend that 
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characterized Britain’s Atlantic empire, one that needs to be more fully explored in order 
to understand empire and its conflicts. The dual conflicts may have been imperial in 
origin, but they had clear implications for provincial societies that were called upon to 
sacrifice materials, wealth, and people.  
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